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Abstract 
This work con<.:erns itse lf with the possibility of solutions , both <.:Ooperat ive and market based, 
to pollu tion abatement problrms. In part icular, we arc in terested iu pollu tant emissions in 
Soutlwrn California and possib l0. solu tions to tlw :::~batPmcnt problems enumerat<:>d in the 
1990 Clea n Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has bern im plemented to reduce 
emissions, creating property rights associated with Ya rious pollutants. 
Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we 
considt>r tlw existeH<.:e of COOJWrativc solutions. In Chapter 2. we examine pollutant emissions 
as a transboundary public bad. \Ve show that for a class of rnvironments in which pollu t ion 
moves in a bi-d i rectiona I, acyclic man ncr, therP exists a S11stai mtblc coalition structu rc and 
associated levels of emissions. 'vVe do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to 
modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potenti a l defection from them) than the 
standard definitions. 
However, this leaves thr question of implemeHLiHg pollution abaLemeHL programs una u-
swcrcd. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been 
undPrstood , thP implementation of such programs has !wen difficul t . The design of Los 
Angeles ' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAI)JI) a lleviated some of the imple-
mrntation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping 
cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regioHs. While these 
drsign features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory cont rol, they estab-
lish a w ry difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the 
transactions costs rnu rnrrated above and the illiquid ity i nd ucrd by the myriad assets and 
r<'lat iw ly few part icipants in this market. 
It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) 
was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market ( CV :-!far-
kc! ). Before discussing the performance o[ the RECLAIM progra m in genera l and the ACE 
mcdmnism in parti<.:ttlar, we test experimentally whether a port folio t rading me<.:hanism can 
Vl 
overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimcntall:v demonstrates Lhc abili ty of a portfolio 
trading rnPrhanism to owrronw portfolio rPhalanring prohiPrns, thC'rPhy inducing sufficiC'nt 
liquidity for markets to fully <'quilibratc. 
\Vith experimental cvidcnc<' in ha nd. we consider th<' CV l\Iarkel's performance in the 
rea] world. 'We find that as Lhc a ll ocation of permits rC'duccs to lhc level of historical 
cmissious, prices a re increasing. As or April of Lhis year, prices arc roughly equal to Lh<' 
cost of the 8C'st A vailablr Cont rol TC'ch no logy (BACT). This took longer than expected, d uc 
both to t<'ndC'ncies to mis-r<'port C'missious nnd<'r the old rcgim<' , and abatement technology 
advances encouraged by the program. \Yc a lso find that the ACE market provides liquidi ty 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
T he fo cus of the follO\\·ing work is t he existence of cooperat iw and market-based solut ions 
to pollution abatement problems. In C hapter 2, we consider pollu tant emissions as a trans-
hou nda ry p11 bl ic bad. T hat is. poilu t.ion is considered as a by-prod uc: t. of prod uction, wh ere 
the produced priYate good is enjo_ved within t he region that produces it but the pollu-
tion r mi tted crosses regional bounda ries. \\'hile local public goods models are genera lly 
well-understood, few have considered the possibili ty of the public goods crossing from one 
loca li ty to auother. In the few models t hat have, distance between r{'gions and the patterns 
in which ai r (and hence, emissions) moves has not been generally considered. 
'We show t hat for a class of environments in which pol lu t ion moves in a bi-directional, 
acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coali tion structure a nd associated levels of emis-
s ions. \Ve d o so via a new core concept, one more a ppropriate to modeling coopera tive 
emissions agreements (and potentia l defect ion from t hem) t ha n t he standard defini t ions. 
The Slackelbery co·re assullles t hat a drfrct ing coali tion acts as a S t ackelberg leader, assum-
ing a IH'st response on behalf of t he non-defecting parties. This core concept is sequential 
in naturr, reflect ing t hat. if a set of rrgions defects from a t.rraty it could be quite a while 
before t he other treaty signatories observe his defection and can respond. 
Thr work in Chapter 2 only considers the existence of a coopera tive solution to emissions 
a batement problems. It leaves uJ u-'tnswrred the questions of implementing reduced emissions 
levC'ls ouce t hey have bC'en agreed upon. In lhis thesis, we concern ourselves wit h pollulant 
emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to t he emissions abatement problems 
C'lllJmcrntrd in the 1990 C lr an Air Act. In the cnsr of SouthC'rn Californ ia , a tradahlc 
po llu tion permit program has bC'en implenH' nted to reduce emissions, c reating property rights 
associated with various poilu tants. 
Thr property rights a pproach to rnvi ronmental protection has its roots in a 1960 paper 
by H.onald Coasc [8]. He a rgued th a l by maki ng propC'rty right s explicit and transferable, 
the market could play a role in bot h valuing th(' rights and ensming that they gravi tate to 
2 
their best use. This is achieved by allowing the market to value these rights. 
In 1994, facf'cl with thf' ncf'cl to rPcluce polh1tant concentrations in order to come into 
compliance with the ambient standards set by the Clean Air Act, the Southern California 
Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) launched the TI.Egional CLean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM). This program was adopted to provide facilities with added flexibility in 
mecling emission reduction requircmcuts and to lower the cost of compliance. The program 
shifted the burden of idcntif_ving appropriate control strategies from the control a uthori ty to 
the pollnter. In part, this shift was a necessity, driven by the fact that traditional processes 
were incapable of identifying enough appropriate technologies to produce sufficiently strin-
gent reductions. As a result of the flexibility inherent to the TI.ECLAIM program, pollution 
prevention in LA has been given an economic underpinning. All strategies can compete on 
a level playing field. 
Montgomery [27] formally solved the problem of proving the existence of a cost-effective 
permit market equilibrium in the case of location-specific emissions. Generally, those sources 
with higher marginal impacts on the environmental target would pay higher prices per unit 
of emissions. However, location-specific targets are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
implement, as t he monitoring costs arc prohibitively high. The administrative difficulties 
associated with the ambient permit system has sent economists searching for a more feasible 
approach. While these more feasible alternatives may not sustain Montgomery's least-cost 
allocation , they may represent a n improvement over the traditional command-and-control 
approach. 
One such alternative is a zonal permit system. Th is deals with the spatial dimension of 
the problem of ambient air quality control by dividing the control area into a grid containing 
a number of zones. In the most restric tive form of this approach, trades would be a llowed 
within zoues, but uot between. Less restrictive forms of zona l permit systems allow trades 
between zones using predefined trading ratios. The zonal approach is appealing as it provides 
a miclcl.le ground between purely emissions-based systems (which have the dual problem of 
over-controlling distant sources and leading to hot-spots) and the location-specific rules 
suggested by :.1ontgomery. In the case of nECLAIM, a two-zone system was implemented. 
Zone one is for coastal polluters, a nd zone two for inland. Because of the prevailing wind 
3 
currents. coastal polluters arc forbidden to use inland permits but inland polluters can usc 
coastal permits. 
Programs such as RECLAIM, however, are fraught with implementation problems. One 
such problem is that of transactions costs, including the costs of finding an appropriate trad-
ing partner, establishing terms of trade, and completing the arrangements. Theory tells us 
that in the absence of transactions cosls, pcrmilmarkets cau reallocate control responsibiliLy 
such that control is achieved at a minimum cost. At any point in time remaining lower cost 
control options create trrtding opportunities, until the minimum cost-effective allocation has 
been reached. However, when faced with significant control costs, permit markets may not 
be cost-effective (see Stavins [36] for an excellent discussion of the role of transactions costs). 
The design of the RECLAil\I program in part alleviated some of the potential for large 
transactions costs, and in part exacerbated them. In order to smooLh trading behavior, two 
overlapping cycles of permits were issued. A cycle one permit for a given year is an effective 
credit between January 1st and December 31st of that year , whereas a cycle two permit 
is effective July 1st to June 30th of the following year. Additionally, as discussed above, 
separate permits were issued for each of t\\"O zones in the South Coast Air Basin. Any given 
trading credit is only valid for the year, cycle, zone, and pollutant for which it is designated. 
Initially, permits were issued for 1994 - 2010. which implies a total of 136 permits available 
in the initial market. 
While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory 
control, it establishes a very difficult trading environment with t he potential for inefficiency 
arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the 
myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market. It was with these concerns in 
mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. As we will discuss 
further iu Chaplcr 4, the ACE market utilizes au iterated combined-value call market (CV 
Market). The market mechanism used by ACE is based on research conducted at Cal tech 
in 1993 (Ishikida et al. [19]). ACE allows birlckrs to submit contingP.nt ordP.rs (I want A if 
a nd only if I can also secure B), matches revealed surplus, and calculates prices that leaves 
bidders at least as well off for having participated as if they had not. 
The ACE market is the first CV Market to be implemented in a tradable pollution permit 
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market. \Vhile Ishikida et al. ran extensive testbedding of their mechanism in context of 
the RECLATM m<1.rkc: t, <1. more gc:ner<1.l eompti.rison of the perform<1.nee of eombinerl-vti.lnc: 
markets to traditional , pa rallel markC'ts is in order. 
Therefore, before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and 
the ACE mechanism in particular , in Cha pter 3 we test experimentally a portfolio trading 
mechanism thaL overcomes markeL illiquidity. T his work grew out of Lhe key finding in work 
by Bossaserts, Kleiman and Plott (BKP) [4], that thin markets (markets with only a few 
participants) fail to completely equilibrate. That is, liquidity dries up before full equilibrium 
is reached. BKP conjectured that the problem with thin markets could have been caused by 
difficulties that traders faced when rebala ncing their portfolios. Participants attempted to 
trade up to more desirable portfolios, yet were frustrated when unable to coordinate trade 
in Lhe component permits. T he risk that orders would only partially be fill ed made traders 
hesitant to engage further in the markets' activity. 
In pollution emissions markets, the obj ects of interest for market participants arc gener-
ally streams of emissions permits, not individual ones. T herefore, it is surprising t hat trading 
mechanisms arc generally organized as a set of parallel markets, where it is impossible to 
submit an order that depends on events in other markets. The risk of seeing one's portfolio 
only partially re-balanced could be vastly or entirely diminished if one were given the oppor-
tunity to submit contingent cross-market orders, whose execution depends on what happens 
elsewhere in the marketplace. 
The contribution of Chapter 3 is to c:xplore the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism 
to overcome the aforementioned portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient 
liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate. In particular, we s tudy whether our portfolio 
trading mechanism leads markets to full equilibrium in situations where BKP discovered 
that equilibra tion geuerally becomes st uck aloug the way because volume dries up. 
'vVe measure the distance from equ ilibrium by means of two well-known asset pricing 
models, n;:unc:ly, thC' Capital Asset P ricing Model (CAPM) anrl the complete-markets Arrow-
Dcbreu model. 'vVe complement graphical evidence of equilibration with formal tests. The 
tests give the probability that the actual evolu tion of our measures of distance from equi-
librium could have emerged merely by chance. T hat is, we compute the probability that 
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our results would have come about had prices been just random vvalks. Under a random 
walk, no Pconom ic forces (prcsstircs of portfolio demand 11gainst a fixed supply) arc at work. 
The onl:v economic basis for a random walk is simple specu lation, which would indeed make 
prices unpredictable. 
'vVe confirm our conjecture that a portfolio trading mechanism induces full equilibration. 
Equilibrium generally emerges well before volume decreases, indicating that any reduction 
in liquidity must be attributed to exhaustion of gains from trade. We record these res ults in 
an environment where BKP observed that markets did not fully C(]nilihrate because li(]nidity 
dried up. 
After exploring the impact of a combined-value mechanism on an illiquid market in an 
experimental setting, we turn to an empirical analysis of the RECLAIM market in general 
and Lhe ACE mechanism in par ticular. Do our experimental results, indicating the ability 
of a combined-value market to overcome illiquidity, hold up in the real world? 'vVe find 
that as the supply of R.ECLAI!\ I Trading Credits (RTCs) a ligns with the historical level 
of emissions in the LA Basin, that prices of RTCs increase. However, these prices have 
historically fallen quite short of those predicted by economists before the market 's inception. 
While this is in part clue to mis-reporting of abatement costs on behalf of pollu ting firms 
under the previous command-and-control regime, it also reflects the increased abatement 
effor ts that the flexibility of the RECLAIM program encourages. As the allocation of RTCs 
reduces to historical reported emissions, the prices of RTCs have been similarly priced to 
the cost of the Best Avail able Control Technology (BACT) . 
'vVe also find that, while the long-term market docs seem thinly traded, the combined-
value market mechanism used in the ACE market overcomes this illiquidi ty, as predicted 
in Chapter 3. T he combined-value design allows environmental engineers to plan for long-
term production ami cmissious and to do so wilh more security as to the value of their 
investment. However, the CV capabilities of ACE arc rarely used by short-term traders. This 
is lwcause short- ter111 purchases and sa lcs are generally to cover anomalies in the production 
plan . However, since a single-asset bid is simply a degenerate form of combined-value bid, 
imposing the combined-value structure on the short-term market certainly does no harm. 
Indeed. the additional liquidity provided by those few traders who t rade in bundles including 
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both short-term and long-term RTCs provide an impor tant bridge between the two markets, 
improving liqnidity in hoth. 
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Chapter 2 Cooperative Solutions in the Presence of 
Inter-Regional Emissions 
2 .1 Introduction 
In the traditional literat ure on local public goods, it is assumed tha t production of a public 
good (or bad) in a given region is enjoyed only by the inha bitants of that region. While 
au argurneut can be made for t his assmnptiou in the case of mauy traditional local public 
goods (swimming pools, new roads), t his is certainly not a lways the case. This assumption 
is not.::1 hly violated in t he case of pollu t ion. A region involved in production of a good 
may produce pollution as a by-product . \ iVhi le the item being; produced benefits only the 
inha bitan ts of the region , the pollution knows no borders and will effect the region 's neighbors 
as well. This type of spillover is explicitly ruled ou t by Tiebout 's 1956, "A Pure T heory 
of Local Ex penditures" [37], in which be demonstra tes Lhe exis Leuce of au equilibrium iu a 
local public goods environment. 
Two recent papers have explored this problem. In Chander and T ulkens [6], pollution is 
treated as a t ransboundary public bad . They show that the core of the game genera ted by 
these externali ties is nonempty, doing so in a constructive manner by suggesting a mechanism 
which implements a solu tion in t he core. However, the problem is considered in a fairly 
simple environment. T hey assume tha t pollution travels uniformly, a nd that the level of 
ambient air quality for all regions is the same, regardless of location. T his fails to account 
for distance from one's neighbors, prevailing winds, water currents , and so on . 
Conley and Dix [9] examine the problem of spillovers a nd its impact on the level of 
public goods provision a nd on region size. T hey consider the optimal and Nash solutions 
and explore the compa ra tive sta t ics as the level of spillovers changes. \ i\lhile they do a llow 
more flexibility as to how pollu tion travels. they leave the question of sus ta ina ble cooperative 
solu t ions to this problem unanswered. 
8 
In this paper, we explore questions of the existence of a cooperative solution to produc-
tion with pnhlir by-prod ucts th;:1,t spill ow'r into neighboring regions. Unlike Chander and 
Tulkens, we allow pollution to spread non-uniformly between regions. We do, however, re-
strict pollution to movement patterns to those representable by a tree on the set of regions in 
the economy. This restriction still includes a wide range of environments in which pollution 
spillover is a problem. We will discuss Chis restriction further in Sec Lion 2.2.1. Unlike oCher 
examinations of the nature of Nash and cooperative solutions to local public goods problems 
with spillovers , we explicitly treat the physical locations of the regions in relation to one 
another. 
The choice of the appropriate core concept in this environment is a source of debate. 
After considering several alternative definitions (the alpha and gamma cores in particular), 
we define a uew, more appropriate core concept. The Stackelbery cor-e assumes LhaL a 
defecting coalition acts as a Stackelberg leader would, as a first mover. The other players, 
upon observing the chosen actions of the defectors, best respond. This best response is 
factored into the defecting coalition's strategy. This core concept models behavior seen 
when environmental treaties are broken. The seq uential nature of this strategy assumption 
reflects the non-immediacy of the effects of the defection. That is, if a group decides 
to pollute above a level indicated in a treaty, it could be quite a while before the fellow 
signatories can determine this for certain and take retaliatory action. 
vVith this assumption we arc able to show that there exists a stable coalition structure 
and therefore the core of the cooperative game is nonempty. That is, there exists no subset 
of the group that can defect and leave all the defectors just as well off with at least one better 
off. Therefore, a cooperative solution exists to the pollution problem. We also show that 
the 1ash solution to this problem is consistently to overproduce and to overpollute. These 
properties rely crucially ou assumptions abou L how poll u Liou lravels. The importance of 
the assumption of a tree structure is demonstrated in two counterexamples showing t he 
emptiness of the core when this property is lost , and has implications for when a cooperative 
agreement may and may not be tenable. 
T he remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 details the model. 
Section 2.3 solves the omniscient social planners problem, and Section 2.4 describes the 
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non-cooperative game ind uced by the spillovers. Section 2.5 describes the Stackclberg core 
and presents t he main rf's1tl t. Section 2.6 presents a counterexample demonstra ting t he 
importance of t he tree structure . F ina lly, Section 2.7 presents p ossible extensions to t he 
model to include non- t ree structures and Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2 Model 
Consider a t radi t ional local public goods economy with one privat e good and one public 
good (poilu tant emissions) . We have N regions, deno ted i = 1, ... , n . Each region produces 
a private good , denoted by .Xi. Additionally, each region emits pollution ei as a by-product 
of nou-iu c.:reasiug retums- to-scale l cc.:buology :ci = y; ( ei), strictly coucave a !l(l <li!I"ereutiaLle. 
All other factors of production a rc subsumed into the gi( .) funct ion. Moreover , there exists 
a c~ > 0 such that 
l 
> 0 if e; < e? 
ox 
l- . • 0 
~ - = 0 tf e; 2:: ei ue, 
= oo if e; = 0 
(2.1 ) 
T he preferences of the residents of each region a re characterized by a representa tive utili ty 
function of the form u;(xi, ai) = .xi +vi( a;) . The a; terms represent ambient air q uality, 
a function of {ei}t:, 1 and the manner in ·which pollution flows between theN regions. All 
regions have ident ical ut ili ty functions, and vary only in t heir ai = - 2:::;:1 f ij (ej) · T he 
vi( .) por t ion of the utili ty function is concave and differen tiable, with ~ > 0 for a ll ai ~ 0. 
T he fij terms a rc discussed below. 
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2.2.1 Ambient Air Quality, Spillover Coefficients and Trees 
The fij coefficients can be represented by a transformation matrix F (which describes all 
pollutiou flow~ between all member~ of the ecouomy) with ~tructure : 
(2.2) 
Before we can continue, we need a brief review of some graph-lheoreLic terms. A graph 
G on N is a set of unordered pairs of distinct clements of N . A graph is a tree if two distinct 
clements arc linked by a unique path , as earlier discussed. 
The structure Row of emissions from one region to another and its effect on ambient 
a ir quality is critical to understanding the possibili ty of an equilibrium in a spillovers envi-
ronment. For example, if emissions travel in a cyclical manner and the polluter never has 
to be a victim of his own emissions, then this environment red uces to one similar to Laf-
fout 's Garbage Game [22] (which has 110 core). However, if the manner in which pollu t ion 
spreads obeys that dicta ted by a tree structure, t here arc possibili ties for the existence of a 
stable coali tion stru ctm cs. For the majority of this p::~ p er , we will consider only t ree struc-
tures. In the extensions, \ve will consider a more general class of admissible acyclic graph 
configura tions, particularly those where some regions are isolated. 
What makes the fiJS represent a t ree? A tree is a connected graph having no cycles. 
If we have a graph 011 n vertices, it is a tree if and o11ly if it is co11ued ed and has n - 1 
edges. A neighbor-hood matrix is an n * n matrix where if nodes i and j share an edge of 
a graph or if i = j, th e ijth entry is a one, zero otherwise. Thi s describes proximi ty in a 
graph. To get from the above transformation ma trix to a neighborhood matrix, place a one 
in the ijth entry of the adjacency matrix if and only if t here is a non-zero entry in t he ijth 
place of the transformation matrix. T he neighborhood matrix of a tree must have exactly 
2(n - 1) + n = 3n - 2 ones (Lhal is, n- 1 edges represented twice, plus n enLrics on the 
d iagonal) . T his condi tion is necessary, but not sufficient for the associated graph to be a 
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tree. In other words, just being symmetric (a nondirccted graph), with ones on the d iagonal 
and having 3n- 2 onc•'s rloC'sn't gua rnntC'<' that it 's a trC'<' I)('CHIISC' it a lso has to he conn0ct0rl. 
\\'c will discuss in the extensions t he necessity (or lack t hereof) of a connected structure. 
So, environm en ts in which we have a tree structure OIL pollution have the following 
propert ies. If f;1 is posit ive, so is fJi· Fur thermore, no more than 3n- 2 of t he entries can 
he p ositive, iBcluding t lw f iiS· 
In simplest terms, the fiJS could be a. dis tance m<:'asnre. How<>vC'r, our environment reflects 
a morC' g<>n <>ral s<>t of circumstance's t hnn rC'gions whose spillovNs a r<> solely a function of 
distance. Imagine three regions in a line. Furt hermore, imag ine regions one a nd three are 
on hilltops. while region two is down in t he va lley between them. R egions one and three 
may very well have a greater impact on each other's pollution than docs region two. T he 
lrausfon nalion matrix we use a llows for this sit uat io n. As long as regions one a nd t hree arc 
"p ollution neighbors," t hen t hey a re admitted in our model. 
2 .3 The Social Planner's Problem 
.For effic iency in the overall cconollly, l hc omniscient f:>Oc ial plauuer maximi~es the sum of 
thC' utility functions for each region. 
m ax xi+ vi(ai) 
{.r,,P1 }.~ 1 
subject to gi(ei) ~Xi 
N 





BN·<utSC' of our concnvity ass umptions and the ndclitivC'ly SC'pamble ut ility functi on, we 
can plug the constraints into the uti li ty function and solve the following unconstrained 
maximization problem: 
N 
ma\~ g;(e;) + v;(- L f.;J(ej)) 
{e.}~=l j=l 
(2 .6) 
ThC' solution to t his maximizat ion problC'm y ields the Pareto Efficient vector of pollution 
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levels, denoted ( e; , .... e;,). T his vector satisfies the following equality, for all i: 
N 
g~(e; ) = L: v~(-.fj;(e;)) * ./j; (2.7) 
j = l 
Each regiou sets their margina l p roduct of poilu Liou equal to Lhe sum of Lhe margina l 
ut ili t ies wit h respect to tha t region 's pollution level weighted by the size of the spillover eff ect. 
This is a similar efficiency cone! ition t.o the classical Sii muelson Con eli t.ion for provision of 
a public good [29]. T he Samuelson cond it ion , which keeps all regions isolated from one 
another, tell us t hat the ratio of the ma rginal ra te of substi tu tion between the public good 
and t he private good should be equal to their margina l rate of transformation . What we 
have here is more geueral. T his couditiou s la tes that the marginal ra te of substit ut ion 
multiplied by the impact that your emissions have on all regions' ambient air quality should 
he eqnal to the ma rginal rate of t ra nsformation. As in C hancier a nd Tnlkens, for all Pareto 
E fficient states of this economy, the pollution vector is unique. T his follows directly from 
the strict concavity of the ut ility fun ction . 
Note t he comparative st atic of how the Pa reto Efficient level of emissions changes with 
the magnitude of the spillover parameter. As the strength of Lhe spillover effect increases, 
the Pareto Efficient level of emissions decreases. So, a region on the edge of the society 
would be allowed to pollute at a higher rate than one in a dense a rea. 
2.4 The Non-Cooperative Game 
\Ve now turn to the issue of the noncooperative game induced by the emission spillovers. 
Ra ther than considering the level at which a social planner would set emissions for all 
locali ties, we now consider what a regional development entrepreneur would decide upon for 
his ind iYidual region . To define the noncooperative game, we must first define the strategy 
set availa ble to players. The stra tegy set for player i is to choose a feasible level of output 
and emissions from : 
(2.8) 
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Each region takes the production of rmissions in all other regions as giYen, and maximizes 
his own 11 t i I i t.y with n'SpC'f't to his prod uct.ion a nrl lwn c0 0111 issions. H <" solv<>s 
where ei 
N 
max 9i(ei) + v;(- L f,j(e1 )) e, 
j=l 
= e · for all ;· E N, j =I= i .7 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
Each r0gion solves t. his probkm by s0tJing g; (ri ) = h iv;,(a ,). D0not0 t. his solation by Ci· 
Note that ei 2: e;: for a ll i E N. Only in the degenerate case, where !;1 = 0 for all i =I= _j, 
is t he Nash point Pareto efficient. T hat is, only if a ll regions arc so isolated that no one 
region's emissions has an effect on anothrr's a mbient ai r quali ty (f;1 = 0 for all i,j in N ), 
then the purely selfish action is socia lly op t imal. 
\Vhen a coalition S agrees to play together, t heir strategy set expands to the joint strategy 
spacr. T his is represented by 
T(S) = {(.'l:,,ri)icsiO ::; ri , Vi E S;O::; I:: :ti::; L9i (r~)} (2 .11 ) 
iES tCS 
T he joint strategy choice [(x1 , e1 ) , ••• , (:r11 , en)] E T(N) induces a feasible state (x, e, a) if 
ai = - 2::::: h1 (eJ) for all i . Because the ac tions of t he players outside of a ny given coalition 
S a ffects the feasibi li ty of any strategy for that coali t iou , ratlwr tha u simply definiug a [T, u] 
game, we define the noncooperative game [N, T , u]. 
2.5 The Stackelberg Core 
To study the properties of the corl' , \\"e must understand the value of a coalition in the [N, T, u] 
gamr. To do this in an environment with spillO\·ers, \\"e must makr assumptions about the 
rrsponsive act ion in which t he members of N/S engage when coali t ion S forms. The a -core 
assumes that the players in N / S adopt a minimax strategy. rrsponding to S's actions in 
the way that is worst for S . T his is t he solut ion concept employed in Laffont 's version of 
Lhc "Garbage Game" and in i'vlalrr 's '·Acid Rain Game" [24] . However, unlike these Lwo 
('Xamph)s, in our environml'nt whl'n a region pollutes it is a victim of its own pollution. 
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Therefore, in this model if region j E N IS p lays a minimax strategy by increasing emissions, 
the <'tction could hmt j m orf' th<'tn i t wot tld i E S, <'tnd t hereforf! t h e (l'-COrf! is inappropri <'tte 
as a solution concept in our model. 
C ha ncier and Tulkens introduced the 1-core as a suitable solut ion concept for the spillovers 
environment. In this approach when a coali tion deviates it plays fully cooperatively (maxi-
mizing the sum of the u t ili ty) and looks at the resulting equilibrium from its actions. T his 
coalition S assumes t hat when it devia t es, the members of N IS break up into single ac-
tors all p laying a ]\"ash strategy. In a spillovers environment this is more realistic than 
the minimax behavior assumed in the a-core. The j oin t strategy choice can be seen as a 
Nash equilibrium in which coalition S acts as one individual playing against t he individual 
members of N IS. However, t his constr ains the group to play a fu lly cooperative solution 
(efficien t wit h respect to the coalition) within the group, and assumes a sim ultaneous move 
on behalf of the members of N IS . T hese a re not realistic constraints in t he model we a re 
exploring. Rather, we would like the defecting coalition to be able to adopt any s trategy it 
wants, including one where some m embers of the coalition play differently than others, as 
will become importa nt below. 
So, we in troduce a new core concept, the Stackelberg coTe. We assume that when a 
coalition deviates it plays like a Stackelberg leader. It can choose any strategy it wants, 
and when it <.:alculates the value of this strategy it takes into a<.:count the best response 
that the members of N IS will have to this deviation once they have observed it. v·..re can 
think of regions as playing a Cournot-like game <'Lgainst one another. The following example 
demonstrates the meaning of this core concept rela tive to those of the a and 1 core when 
N = {1 , 2}. t 
Assume we have two identical regions with utilities represented by: 
LThis is quite different from the consistent set discussed in Chwe (7]. If a n allocation a is in t he consistent 
set , then it. satisfies the indirect dominance property. That. is, if a coali tion S defects to point a , and some 
other coalition t hen defects from a to b (b directly dominating a), t hen this series of defections from defections 
wil l event ua lly land the group at allocation c, which is less-prefered than a . However, in the Stackelberg 
core, if a coalition S defects to a, t he coalition members assume a best response on behalf of the individuals 
iu N / S . These best responses will laud the players all at allocation b. But, t he coal itiou S predicted t his 
move, ami ouly moved to u because they vVANTED to wiud up at b. 
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'll J (2 .12) 
(2 .13) 
If these two regions were playing cooperatively, they would choose e7 = e2 = 6, corresponding 
to a utility level of 18 for the two together. The a-core tells us that if region 1 defected from 
this, region 2 would do the vvorst thing possible for region 1 and set e2 = eg. As long as 
this threshold is sufficiently high, t his will reduce utili ty to zero. In the !'-core, both players 
would employ a Nash strategy. This would yield e1 = 32 ~e? = 8, e2 = 32~e 1 = 8, yielding a 
utili ty level of 8 for P-ach playP-r. In thr Stackelbrrg core, player 1 rlP-viates assuming a ash 
reaction on the part of player 2. So, he maximizes his utility function, assuming ei' = 32;e' . 
He maximizes 
1 3 1 32- e1 2 Ut=3el+(--)(--e~--( )) 
4 4 4 3 
(2.14) 
This y ields ef = 12
9
, e~ = 12
5 , with corresponding utility levels of Ut - 34
3
, u2 = 24
6
. Now 
that we know what each player can achieve under each core assumption, what docs the core 
look like for each? As shown in Figure 2. 1, if the a-core is used, the entire Pareto efficient 
frontier is in the core. For the !'-core, the highlighted section which makes each player at 
least as well off as they are at u;(e{") is in the core. For the Stackelberg core, the set of 
points that make each player as well off as they a rc at ui(ef) when i is the Stackelberg leader 
is in the core. Note t hat this core is smaller than either the a-core or the !'-core and is 
contained in both. 
Once we have defined the appropriate responsive behavior assumptions, we can express 
the characteristic function of this game as: 
V(S) = max 2:)x; + vi(a;(e))] 
(x;,Pi);e s . 
tE8 
subj rct to L .r,i < L gi(c;) 
iES iES 








F igure 2.1: The (I' core, 1 core and Stnckelberg core 
where all j E N/S m axim ize x1+v1(a1(e)) subject to x1 ::=:; gj(ej) a nd aj =- I.:: iEN fji(ei) · 
Using this characteristic function , we can evaluate every strategy t hat a coali t ion m ay con-
sider in terms of the aggregate payoff to t hat coalit ion . 
A strategy of a coali t ion N is said to belong to t he core of t he cooperative [N, V] game 
if t he payoff it yields for each coalit ion S c N is bigger than the payoff V(S). We will now 
establish that t here exist strategies t hat belong to t he core of this game. T he int ui t ion of 
t he nonemptiness of t he core is as follows. We use a resul t by Demange [11] to show that the 
counecLed core is nonempty. T hat is , if we only a llow coalitions t hat a re representable as 
a G-connected su bsets of a t ree, t here exists a connected coali t ion structure such that t here 
is then th0re is no coali t ion t hat can improve on thl? value generated by it . We t hen show 
that if a connected coali t ion is not profi table, t hen neither is a ny non-connected coalit ion . 
In order to appeal to Demange's theorem, we need a little more graph- t heory. A subset 
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S of N is G-connected if t he path between the two points of S is contained w S . So, 
thi s rC'st. rirts liS to SllbSC'ts S t ha t arC' connf'rt f'<i. which in our C' twironment mf'ans that. 
wC' consider coalitions that consist of regions next to each othC'r. For example, if we arc 
considering North America, l\ Icxico and Canada arc not G-conncctcd . However , if we add 
in the United Sta tes, t hese Lhrcc regions make up a G-connccLcd set. Lastly, a G-connected 
set is said lo be G -stable if il is uoL blocked by a ny G-counccLed scL. G-sLabili ty can be 
shown to be equivalent to t he noncmptincss of the core when only G-connccted subsets arc 
allowrd to considf' r defrction. 
Theorem 1 If regions and their- spilloveTs can be r·epTesented as a tr-ee on N, the f easible set 
for· any coalition S is compact and utility is continuous joT all player·s then the S tackclberg 
cor·e of the [N, 11] game is nonempty. 
Proof First we demonstrate that if only connected coali t ions a rc considered , then the core 
of a genera l [N, V] game is noncmpty. Then we show that if a connected coali t ion cannot 
form profitably, then neither can any non-connected coali t ion. 
1. By Demangc [ll], we know that if t he feasible set for any coali t ion S is compact 
and ut ili ty is cont inuous for a ll players and G is a t ree on N, t hen there exists a G-
sLable coalition structure. T his i111plies that the connected core of the [N, \/] game is 
noncrnpty. T he idea of t he proof is tha t the existence of a G-stable coalition structure 
can be shown to be equivalent to the non-emptiness of t. hc core a genera l cooperat ive 
game. The game is supcraddi Livc and its essential coalitions a rc all G-connectcd, 
and Demange then uses Scarf 's t heorem to show tha t t hese properties guaran tee t he 
noncmptiness of the connected core. 
2. 1ext, we want to show that t he uoue1uptiuess of tht• connected core implies t he 
nonempt iness of the core. \ Ve do this by shO\Ying that for a ny non-connected coalition 
S, tlw smalles t conrwcted coalition containing Scan always do at least as well. Bu t, 
that coali t ion is a connected coali t ion a nd can be cxprC'ssccl as a G-connected subset 
of a t ree on N . Therefore. it cannot improve on wha t it receives under V(N). 
3. 'vVc know LhaL a coali t iou S playing sLra Legy e~ (LbaL is, emissions levels tha t arc 
18 
cooperatire within the coalition) faces utility level L iES' ui(e~, e%18 ). If this coalition 
is c:onnedecl , there is no stmtegy profile e~ that makes the players in S hetter off 
than were they to play the fu lly cooperative solut ion . But, what if coali tion S is not 
connected? Define T to be smallest set of players such t hat { S U T} is a connected 
coalition. 'vVe know that at the very least { S U T} could form a coalition in which all 
j E T continues to play the ash strategy and all i E Splay cooperat ively. T herefore, 
F(S U T) 2: V(S) + L ui(e~, e%;s) (2.18) 
jET 
So, connected coalition S U T can always do at least as well as the non-connected 
coalition S could on its own. I'\ ote that this is the worst case scenario when j E T join. 
That is , since S could form profitably, the members of S cou ld compensate t he members 
ofT by E to change their output and make V(SUT) > V(S) + LjET ui(ef, e%1s)· But, 
we kno"· that the connected core of this game is nonempty. Therefore, the core is 
nonempty. 
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2.6 Counterexamples Demonstrating the Importance 
of the Tree Structure 
As emphasized earlier, the reciprocal and non-cyclical nature of the emissions spillovers is 
critical to our result. We require that regions and their spillovers are representable as a 
tree on the set N . This does not admit purely unidirectional pollution flows. The following 
two counterexamples demonstrate this fact, and show that there exists a stable coalition 
slrucLure when we modify the neighborhood matrix to represent a Lrec. 
2.6.1 Purely Unidirectional Pollution Flows 
T he following is a simple example of the emptiness of the core when we don't abide by the 




and constant returns-to-scale production xi = 2ei · Furthermore, imagine a prevailing wind, 
such that pollut ion only travels counte rclockwise around the circle (from 1 to 2, from 2 to 
3, from 3 to 1) a nd that you only feel pollution effects from your closest neighbor. This ex-
ample corresponds to a regional relationship wit h a ir currents t hat do not change seasonally. 
Specifically, consirler the following pollution transformation m atrix : 
1 0 .6 
.1 1 0 
0 .4 1 
(2 .20) 
T he Pareto efficient level of pollution is e1 ~ 3.302, e2 ~ 2.95 and e3 ~ .616. T he 
corresponding utili ty levels a re ·u1 ~ 4.23, e2 ~ 4.21 and e3 ~ 1.42. However , in this 
situation of unidirectional flows, player 1 would like to be in a coali t ion with p layer 3, 
yielding ut ili t ies 11 1 ~ 4.81, c2 ~ 4.21 and c3 ~ .67. M0anwhilc, player 2 would like to be 
in a coalition with player 1, yielding 'U1 ~ 1.97, e2 ~ 4.57 and e3 ~ 1.97. Finally, player 3 
would like to be in a coalition with player 2, wit h utili ties 'U1 ~ 1.25, e2 ~ 3.94 and e3 ~ 3.25. 
T here is no stable coalition structure. 
Now, rather than having a unidirectiona l Lrausmission patte rn , imagine that pollu tion 
flows from player 1 towards both players 2 and 3 in one season , a nd then t here is a shift , 
transmitting emissions from player 2 and 3 to player 1. T his is t he case in t he below 
transform ation ma trix. 
1 .3 .6 
.1 1 0 
.4 0 1 
(2.21) 
In t his case, both players 2 and 3 would like to collude with one another , yielding utility 
levels 'U 1 ~ - 1.9,e2 ~ 4.89 a nd e:1 ~ 4.56. 
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2.6.2 Acid Rain 
VVe can a lso construct a counterexample corresponding to the situation o f acid rain.2 
Let pollution tntnsmissions b e represeutecl by : 
[ : 0~4 ~ 1 (2 .22) 
One can think of player one as Minneapolis, two as Chicago, a nd three as New York. 
Once again, this non-tree struct ure leaves us without a stable coalition structure. Minnesota 
would like to be in a coali t ion with New York , Chicago with Minnesota, and New York with 
C hicago. 
However, if we slightly perturb the t ransmission so that t here is feedback from Chicago 
to Minneapolis and from New York to C hicago, the scenario cha nges. 
I 
.9 .04 0 
.4 1 .5 
0 0.04 1 
(2.23) 
Now. Tew York and M innesota would both like to collude with o ne another and leave 
C hicago out of the deal eulirely. 
2 When the level of spillovers get very small between two regions, t here is still potential for stable coal it ion 
formation. However, they arc strange coalitions. For example, in th is game, at small levels of flowbacks 
(from 3 to 2, and 2 to 1), both players 1 and 3 would like the coalition (Chicago, NY ) to form. However, 
player 2 would prefer a coalition involving only players 1 a nd 3, leaving him out entirely. This makes intuitive 
sense. Since the spillovers are far stronger from player 1 to player 2 than they are from player 3 to player 2, 
and the spillovers arc a lso quite small from player 2 to player 1, the 1,3 coalition makes player 2 very happy. 
He has to cut back very lit tle to please player 1, and in return gets a major emissions reduction. however, 
both players 1 and 3 would prefer that the coalition 2,3 happens. Why? Player 1 doesn't have to cut back 
at a ll , and player 3 gets a major l.Jeuefit for a small cutl.Jack. This anomaly will l.Je explored further auother 
paper. 
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2. 7 Extensions to the Model 
2.7.1 Non-Cyclic, Non-Tree Structures 
As we have discussed extensively, t he t ree structure ind uced by the pollu t ion t ransmission 
patterns is essentia l for our demonstration of t he existence of a cooperat ive solu tion . How-
ever, there is an extension to another class of emissions configurations as well. Imagine 
regions in our economy that a rc so rem ote that their emissions effects the ambient air qual-
ity of no other region, nor are t hey affected hy anyone else. In the extreme, as d iscnssed 
in Section 2.4, when no one region is affected by another, the Nash level of pollution is the 
Pareto efficient level. However, in a more moderate case, when som e regions a re isolated, 
they will never be par t of a coalition structure in a ny meaningful way (any way that changes 
their behavior). 
Proposition 2 If regions and their spillover·s can be represented as a non-cyclical, nondi-
rected gr-aph on N , the feasible set for any coalition S is compact and utility is continuous 
for all players, then the Stackelber-g core of the [N, 11] game is nonempty. 
2.7.2 Intermediate Preferences and Tiebout Equilibrium 
Furthermore, t here are many transformation matrices t hat, in our model, exhibi t the prop-
erty of intermediate preferences. That is, if an agent is between two others on t he t ree, 
whenever t he latter agree on t heir ranking of a lternat ives a a nd b, so does the former. More 
precisely, iutennediaLe preferences imply thaL Lherc is a t ree ou N such that for auy a lter-
natives a and b, the sets { i E N, ui(a) > ui(b)} and { i E N, ui(a) 2: ui(b)} are G-connccted . 
Proposition 3 If regions and their spillovers can be represented as a non-cyclical, nondi-
rected gr-aph on N, the feasib le set for any coalition S is compact, utility is continuous for 
all players, the [ N, v'] game e.rhibits increasing power of coalitions, and we have intermedi-




VVe have shown that in a simple model of local public goods with spillovers, it is possible 
to fine! a coali tion structure anc! ~n allocat ion for a ll coali t ions in the economy such that no 
subset S C N can do better for its members. While t he type of public good we have in 
mind is pollution emissions, t his model could extend to other public goods produced and 
primarily enjoyed in a given region, but with its effects felt in neighboring regions. For 
example, funding for the arts or building an airport. 'We have a lso shown that without 
the reciprocal feature of spillovers assumed here, it is possible that there is no sustainable 
cooperat ive solu t ion. T his obscrv~Jion has profound policy implications. For example, 
there may not be a sustainable cooperative solution to issues such as acid rain traveling; 
unidirectionally. However, in regions where pollution spreads in a manner similar to a 
distance function, there is hope. For example, local ambient a ir quality problems may be 
solvable. 
Applying the notion of the Stackelberg core has natural interpretations in the realm of 
coopera.t. ive environmcnta.l solutions. In paxticula.r, imagine a proposf'cl trea.ty. VVhen a 
region considers whether to ratify the treaty, it knows that if it doesn't it will wind up as 
a Stackelberg leader in pollution emissions. So, if it ratifies , it is because it cannot do any 
better for itself by defecting. Therefore, the ratification of t he treaty as a signal of intent is 
the extent of i ts usefulness. 
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Chapter 3 Inducing Liquidity In Thin Financial 
Markets Through Combined-Value Trading 
Mechanisms1 
3.1 Introduction 
The key find ing in a 1998 paper by Bossaerts, Kliem an a nd Plott (BKP) [4] is that thin fin an-
cia l markets (m arkets with only a few participants) fa il to completely equilibrate. Liquidity 
dries up before fu ll equilibrium is reached . The observations in BKP contrast with those in 
an earlier paper by Bossaerts and Plott (BP) [5], where t hick fin ancial m arkets were found 
to fully equilibrate. I t was conjectured in BKP that the problem with thin financial markets 
could have been caused by difficu lties t hat traders faced when rebalancing t heir portfolios. 
Participants attempted to trade up to m ore desirable portfolios, yet were frustrated when 
unable to coordinate trade in the component securities. The risk that orders would only 
partially be filled made traders hesitant to engage fur ther in the markets' activity. Whence 
t he reduction in liquidi ty as the end of trading approached. Notice that this conjecture liuks 
nicely with asset pricing theory, which posits that investors are merely interested in (payoffs 
on) portfo lios of secmities, rather t han the component securit ies. The value of an incliviclual 
securi ty is determined solely by its contribut ion to the risk and return of a portfolio. Beyond 
this , t he risk a nd return of the security itself are irrelevant. 
T he objects of interest for market participants appear to be portfolios, and not individual 
securities. If so, it is sur prising t hat financial markets arc generally organized as a set of 
parallel markets, where it is impossible to submit a n order that depends on events in other 
markets. The experimentA.l financial markets in BKP were a lso set up as a system of parallel 
markets in individual securities. The r isk of seeing one's portfolio only partially re-balanced 
could be vastly or entirely diminished if one were given t he opportuni ty to submit cont ingent 
1 Co- a uthore d with P e ter Bossaerts and Joh n L edyard 
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cross-market orders, whose execution depends on what happens elsewhere in the marketplace. 
In the extrem e, this calls for a drast ic change in the trading mechanism of the marketplace 
towards a system where portfolios can be traded directly. 
The contribution of this paper is to explore the ability of a portfolio t rading mechanism 
to overcome the aforem entioned portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient 
liquidity for m arkets to fully equilil>rate. In particula r , we s tudy whether our p o1-Lfolio 
trading mecha nism leads markets to full equilibrium in situations where BKP discovered 
that equilibration genera lly becomes stuck a long t he way because volume dries up. 
We measure the distance from equilibrium by m eans of two well-known asset pricing 
models, namely, the Capital Asset Pricing !viodel (CAPM) and the complete-markets Arrow-
Debreu model. T he former ma kes a prrcisc prediction about the relat ionship between prices 
of various securities for markets to be in equilibrium; t he latter 's prediction is less specific, 
being ordinal in nature. Both have been used successfully to measure equilibration in t hick 
experimental financial markets (sec [5]) . We complement graphical evidence of equilibration 
with formal tests. The tests give the probability that the actual evolution of our measures 
of distance from equilibrium could have emerged merely by cha nce. That is, we compute 
the probability that our results would have come about had prices been just random walks. 
Under a random walk, no economic forces (pressures of portfolio demand against a fixed 
supply) are at work. The only economic basis for a random walk is simple speculation, 
which would indeed make prices unpredictable. The formal statistical tests arc necessary 
because of recent concerns t hat experimental results can be generated by simple chance 
mechanisms, instead of the economic forces that t hey are usually attributed to. 
Our trading mechanism is designed to cross heterogeneous portfolio orders. This is accom-
plished by a scale-back procedure that is reminiscent of the partial order filling in standard , 
oue-securi ty markets. T he second ingredien t of our trading mecha nism is pricing. :vlar-
kcts need a clear, easily interpretable signal that reflects excess d em and (price increases) or 
excess supply (price decreases). We use constrained , mixed linear-integer programming to 
determine prices and trades. T he constraints are suggested by economic t heory. 
We confirm our conjecture t hat a portfolio t rading mechanism induces full equilibra tion. 
Equilibrium genera lly emerges way before volume decreases, indicating that any reduction 
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in liquidity must be att ributed to exhaustion of gains from trade. We record these results in 
l'tn environment where BKP observed thaJ, market s did not full y Pqui lihrl'tte hecansc liquidi ty 
dried up. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly 
describe how the results in BKP led to our conjecture that a portfolio trading mechanism 
may overcome an incomplete equilibral ion process. In SecLiou 3.3, we discuss our measures of 
distance from equilibrium, which are used to determine the success of our portfolio trading 
mcch<'tnism. In Section 3.4, we describe the experimental setup. The portfolio trading 
mechanism itself is introduced in Section 3.5. Results and tests a rc reported in Section 3.6. 
We conclude in Section 3. 7. 
3.2 Market Structure And Illiquidity In Thin Financial 
Markets 
The BKP paper repartee! on a set of experiments designee! to test eqnilibrat ion in a repeated , 
multiple-as ct market of two risky securities and one risk-free security. While the experi-
ments revealed slow, steady convergence towards equilibrium, volume invaria bly dried up, 
causing the equilibration process to stop short of the equilibrium. It was conjectured that 
equili bratiou halted because of subjects' hesiLance Lo Lrade in the face of ma rket thinness. 
The basis for this conjecture is the following. vVhen an agent wishes to improve the 
risk/reward characteristics of her portfolio, she generally ha.s to simnltaneonsly trade in 
several markets at once. If some or all markets are thin, it is possible that only a strict 
subset of her orders will be executed. T he resulting portfolio may therefore be different from 
the desired one, and even be inferior to the initial portfolio before the trade. 
WiLh only a limiled nutubcr of ageuls, Lhe market rnecltanistu in BKP (a number of 
parallel double auctions) forces traders to actively seek out tra nsactions when they wish to 
rchabnce their portfolios. This involves posting bicls (if buying) or asks (if selling) that 
arc aggrcssiYC enough to solicit trade. Portfolio reallocations, however , usually require one 
to simulta neously execute trades in several markets. Because of the thinness (size) of the 
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markets in BKP, there was a fair cha nce t hat orders would only partially be executed, despite 
cff'orts to make the quotes as attractive as possible. Unfort un r1tely, t he resul t ing portfolio 
may easily have a worse risk/reward trade-off tha n the original one. The risk of end ing up 
with an inferior portfolio m ay induce an optimizing agent not to t ry to improve her posit ion 
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F igure 3.1: An investor who holds posit ion X may want to move to point C, because it has 
a higher return and lower (no) risk. Since X consists of a combination of t he positions A, 
B and C , both A r1nd B ha.vc to be liquidated and addit ional units of C hr1ve to be bought. 
If the investor manages only to sell A, (s)he moves clown to position Y , which is dominated 
by the original position (X). If (s) he can only sell B , (s) he moves to Z, which has higher 
expected return, yet is more volatile. 
T his can easily be illustrated graphi cally if risk can be measured by return volatil ity a nd 
reward by mean return. Imagine a r isk/reward trade-off as in F igure 3. 1. The straight line 
provides the best risk (return volatility) - reward (mean return) tradeoff that anybody could 
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gPt in thP ma rketplace. Th0 curv0d litH' provides the best risk/ reward t radeoff of port folios 
consisting only of risky S<'Cli ri tiPs. T magi IH' that t hPs<' port folios a rP constrnctpcl on t he> 
basis of three securities: A, B and C. The risk and reward of these securi t ies are indicated 
in Figur0 3.1 as welL C has z0ro return Yolatility, a nd , hence, is riskfrcc. Now consider 
position X in the plot. It depicts a port folio consis ting of a combina tion of the riskfrcc 
S<'curiLy (C) and Lhc two risky sccuriti0s (A and B) . This portfolio is clearly dominated by 
th 0 riskfree security, which 0a rns mor<' c!Pspite lower (no) risk. So, on<' could easily improve 
the risk/rPwa rd trade-off of X hy moving towarcls an all riskfrrr portfolio, hy selling t he risky 
securi t ies. If. hmYeYcr, one succePds in selling only holdings of A. the risk/ reward trade-off 
worsens, because we would move towa rds, e.g .. posit ion Y .2 Th0 new position is dominated 
by t h0 old one. On the otlw r hand. if only B is sold , t he new posiLion (e.g., Z in Figure 3.1) 
is not dominated in mean-varia nce space by the old one, bul iL incurs more risk, which the 
agent may not be willing to bear. Consequent ly, a rat ional agent may decide not to rebalance 
thp portfolio . Not only is a11 opportunity to gain from trade lllissed , but also, markets will 
be less liquid. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates tha t thP risk of obtaining inferior port folio positions is less if (i) 
wp submit orders in a pa rticula r sequence (as opposed to simulta n<'O itsly) , (ii) the agent is 
less risk averse. If risk aversion is s ufficient ly low, position Z will be superior to the ini t ia l 
position (X). By first submitt ing orders to sell A, a risk-seeking agent guarantees a better 
outcome. After A is t raded , she can turn to selling B. In large markets, chances arc greater 
that there are enough agents with low risk aversion ,3 who will not refrain from tracling. This 
gcucra tes the necessary order Aow that will a t tract others to the market. Liquidity ensues. 
In sma ll markets these chances a rc slim, so tha t illiquidi ty may follow. 
:'-Jotice that the market mechanism is conjectured to be at Lhc hear t of liquidity problems 
in :-; ruallma rkcts. T he mccha ui:-;m in BKP was oue of parallel double a uclious, where age11Ls 
could not submit orders in one market contingent on events in another. To avoid moving 
from X to Y in Figure 3.1 , one wonld like to snhmit a n orc!Pr to sell a ll of B condi tional on 
a sale of all of A. If such orders ar<' possible, then even a risk av<' rse agent would not refrain 
2T hc exact location would d0pend on th0 amount of cash generated by selling A. 
3 Provided , of course, t ha t agents have heterogeneous attit udes towards r isk . 
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from par ticipating in the t rading. This calls for a portfolio t rading mechanism : a system 
wlw rcby agents can snbm it. orders t.o tntdc: packages of securities, instead of just one. 
Much of the difficulty in implementing a test of our conjecture s tems from the absence of 
flexible portfolio trading mechanisms.4 So, t he challenge was to design such a mechan ism, 
which we will refer to as a c01nbined-value tr-ading system ( CVT) . T his mechanism eliminates 
the natural tendency of parallel markets lo decompose a portfolio and ils valuation into ils 
constitnent parts. Rather, we allow traders to submit bids which reflect t heir desired multi-
security portfolio transactions. Stanrlarrl tmrling mechanisms involve orders by a player i 
which could be described with the pair (b;, q;) . These are orders of the form "i is willing to 
pay up to b; (respectively accept no less than b; if the order is for a sale) for q; units of a 
security." In contrast , CVT allows for orders which can be represented by the N + 1-tuple 
(b; , f/;), meaning "i is willing lo pay up lo b; for l he veclor of uni ts of N securi t ies f/;." 
Addit ionally, agents can submit a scaling parameter, F;. T his scale indicates t he minimal 
acceptable level at. which a bid can be filled. So, now a bid is to be represented by the 
N + 2-tuple (b;, f/i, F;), to be understood as "i is willing to pay up to jb; for t he vector of 
units of N securit ies ff/; , for any f between F; a nd 1." We will discuss CVT in more detail 
in Section 3.5. 
3.3 Measuring Equilibration 
G iven the limited size of the stakes in a typical experiment, we can safely assume that sub-
jects' preferences towards risk can be approximated by quadratic utili ty functions (provided 
of course l hat expected ulilily theory describes their attitudes towards risk in Lhe first place). 
Hence, t he Capi tal Asset Pricing Ylodel (CAPM) would obtain in equilibrium, at least ap-
proximately. The CAPM model predicts that in equilibrium prices will be such that the 
market por tfoli o (i.e. , t he aggregate supply of risky securi ties) is optim al for qu adratic pre£:.. 
erences. T hat is, t he market portfolio genera tes maximum mean return for its volat ili ty. See 
4 See [33, 3-.1] for a Iuccha uism Lhat is related to ours. [33] repor ts experimental resu lt s from multi-
securi ty experiments, but mean-variance preferences were induced , effectively elimina ting uncertainty. In 
our experiments, r isk was explicit. Hence, subjects' na t ural inclinations in the face of uncertainty were the 
basis of trading and pricing. Sec also [19, 25]. 
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Sharpe's 1964 work [32] for a detailed discussion. T his predict ion is independent of agents' 
levels of risk avPrsion, which is significant., because these cannot rP.adily be measured , and 
moreover , may change during t he course of the experiment. 
Consequently, to determine whether experimental markets have eq uilibrated, we compare 
the reward-to-risk trade-off of the market portfolio against the maximum possible trade-off 
availa ble al market prices. T his lradc-ofr is usually referred to as Sharpe mtio, Lo be defined 
as follows. Let RFL denote the return on a risk-free security at time t; le t R mt be the return 
on the market portfolio and let (Jmt denote its volatili ty. The Sharpe ratio of the market 
portfolio is t hen 
T he maximal Sharpe ratio is the rat io or mean relurn in excess of Lhe riskfree rate over 
volatil ity (when a riskfree security exists, the maximal Sharpe ratio is constant for all levels 
of volatility) . 5 
At any moment in our experiments, we measure how far markets arc from equilibrium by 
computing the difference between the market Sharpe ratio and the maximal Sharpe rat io. 
Markets reach equilibrium when the difference becomes zero. This measure was successfully 
employed in an experimental set ting in BKP, as well as the large-scale follow-up study (BP). 
Notice t ltat our distance measure cau be computed without observation or estimation error. 
In field studies, lack of observability of the ma rket portfolio makes it difficult to assess 
whether markets have equilibrated. Likewise, the pfl,yoff di stribution and its parameters 
(means, variances, covariances) have to be estimated, and, hence, sampling error must be 
dealt wit h. In the laboratory, both the market portfolio and the payoff dis tribution are under 
control of the experimenter, and , t herefore, known. 6 
T he siguificauce of our experimeulal results is fur ther euhauced because (i) we made ev-
ery possible effort to teach subjects beforeha nd about the nature of the payoff distribution, 
5 In our computation of t he maximal Sharpe ratio, we did take into account constra in ts on shortselling 
of ri sky securities. ' Vhen short.sale c:onstra in ts ;ue binning, t he maximal Sharpe ratio is not in<iepen<icnt 
of volatility anymore. In that case, we usc t he maximal Sharpe ratio correspon<iing to the vo latility o f the 
m arket portfolio. 
6 T here are ad<iitional problems with field stu<iies, such as the necessity to assume t hat the payoff di s-
tribution can be est imated from obser ved payoff frequencies, a nd t hat agents knew t his payoff distribution 
when set ting prices, etc. None of t hese affect our interpretation of experimental data. 
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by m eans of pre-experiment learning sessions sec details below; (ii) we did not make en-
ciowments common knowledge, iincl ftvoideci their hc:com ing common knowlecige hy chi'tngin g 
them across experiments (like in BP) as well as across periods within an experiment (unlike 
in BP) . The latter means that subj ects could not have deliberately used the CAPM to set 
prices and determine optimal portfolios. 7 Consequently, if we observe equilibrat ion, it is 
only because of the economic forces lhat arc at work, and not because of subjects' deliberate 
usage of t he CAPM. 
Becftnse our expcrimenti'tl financial markets arc complete (there are an equal number of 
states and securities), we can also study a more general prediction about equilibrium. Unlike 
t he CAPM prediction, however, it is ordina l. Implicit in t he prices of traded securities are 
the prices of primit ive state securi t ies (also called Arrow-Debreu securi t ies) that pay one uni t 
of currency iu one slate a nd zero in olhcrs. General equilibrium theory predicts lhat the 
ranking of these so-called state prices will be inverse to t he ranking of t he aggregate wealth 
(payout) , provided that the states a rc equally likely. We will investigate this prediction 
as well. Vie will normalize t he state prices to add up to 1. This way, we work with the 
state-price probabilities that have become popular in mathematical finance (where they are 
also often referred to as equivalent m ar t ingale probabilities) . The prediction abou t ranking 
obviously holds for state-price probabilities as well. 
3.4 Experimental Design 
We conducted a total of seven experiments, indexed in Table 3.1 by the d a te of the session. 
Subjects were recruited from the CalLech community, primarily undergraduates and a few 
graduate students from t he natural sciences a nd engineering. Because of the complexity of 
the trading interface and of t he intricacies of fixed-income trading, recruiting was limited 
to t hose who had taken or were in t he midst of taking courses rela ted to fin ance. Some 
subjects, particularly in later sessions, participated in more t han one session. The number 
of subj ects varied from a low of six to a high of fourteen. 
7 Once in CAPM equilibrium , optimal portfolios can readi ly be constructed as a combination of the market 
portfolio a nd t he riskfree security. 
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Table 3.1: List of Experiments and Parameters 
DaLe Peri od Number EndowmenL Exchange 
SubjecLs Type /\ B c RaLe 
11/1/99 1 - 5 6 3 9 1 0 0.02333 
3 l !J 0 0.02333 
ll/4/99 1 - 6 14 7 9 1 0 0.02333 
7 1 9 0 0.02333 
I I f I I j99 I - 4 II 4 9 I 0 0.02333 
7 1 9 0 0.02333 
5-6 10 ' I 9 1 0 0.02333 
6 1 9 0 0.02333 
Ll / 16/99 1 1-1 9 9 1 0 0.02333 
5 1 !J 0 0.02333 
2 14 lO 9 l 0 0.02333 
4 1 9 0 0.02333 
3 14 9 9 I 0 0.02:13:1 
5 1 9 0 0.02333 
4 13 10 9 1 0 0.02333 
3 1 9 0 0.02333 
5 13 9 9 1 0 0.02333 
4 1 9 0 0.02333 
6 13 7 10 10 0 0.02333 
1 18 2 0 0.02333 
I I 9 0 0.023:1:1 
2 9 l 0 0.02333 
2 2 18 0 0.02333 
11/30/99 1 - 4 15 10 9 l 0 0.02333 
5 1 9 0 0.02333 
5 14 lO 9 1 0 0.02333 
4 1 9 0 0.02333 
6 14 9 9 l 0 0.02333 
!\ I 9 0 0.02:1:1:1 
12j2j99 1- 5 12 6 6 3 0 0.03 
3 3 6 0 0.03 
3 4 5 0 0.03 
6 8 5 6 0 3 0.03 
3 4 5 0 0.03 
7 7 3 6 3 0 0.03 
3 3 6 0 0.03 
I 4 5 0 O.o:l 
8 7 3 6 3 0 0 .03 
1 3 6 0 0.03 
3 4 5 0 0.03 
12/7/99 1 - 2 1'1 9 9 1 0 0.03 
5 1 9 0 0 .03 
3 13 10 9 1 0 0.03 
3 1 9 0 0.03 
4 13 R 9 I 0 0.0:1 
5 1 9 0 0.03 
5 13 8 9 1 0 0.03 
5 1 9 0 0.03 
6 13 10 9 1 0 0.03 
3 l 9 0 0.03 
7 13 8 9 1 0 0.03 
5 1 9 0 0.03 
R 6 ;; 9 I 0 O.o:! 
1 1 9 0 0.03 
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\Ne created three securities, denoted A, B, a nd C, each with a life of one period. At t he 
end of the pPriod, e<'tc.h sec.nrity paid a sing!C' dividf'nd a nd was then n~tired. The magnitude 
of the dividend depended on a ra ndom draw of one of thr<'e equally likely states, X, Y and 
Z. The state was drawn after the period was closed , so there was no insider or asymmetric 
information. T he payoff table was as follows: 
State 
Sec:mity X Y Z 
A 170 370 150 
B 160 190 250 
c 100 100 100 
:.Jotice that the dividend of A varies dramatically from state to state (with an expected value 
of 230) , t he dividend of B varies less and has an expected value of 200 , and the dividend of 
C is constant al 100. 
Each exp eriment consisted of mul t iple periods of similar trading conditions, varying only 
by the initial allocations given to subj ects. At the begi nning of a period, each player was 
supplied with some securit ies A a nd B, and some francs cash (an experimental currency whose 
com·ersion rate into dollars is indicated in Table 3.1). The period proceeded in a number of 
rounds, the first round three minutes in length and subsequent rounds ninety seconds long. 
At Lhe end of each round, a ll trading was slopped while the allocation a lgorithm (described 
in Section 3.5) solved for a ll trades. These trades were executed, and net t rad e and market 
prices were announced. Then another round began. The number of rounds in a period 
varied between experiments. T he November experiments had 10 rounds per period. As we 
will report in Section 3.6, it appeared that m arkets equ ilibrated and subjects s lowed their 
activity after 5 to 8 rounds. T herefore, the December experiments had only seven rounds per 
period. At the end of a period, one of the three states was chosen a nd announced, players 
were paid their dividemls according to the payoff table, aud the period ended. Then, we 
began another period , with new allocations. In the case of the November experiments, t he 
SC'ssion consisted of six periods. and the Dec<'mber sessions were e ight periods long. Subj ects 
knew about the length of t he session t hey were in . 
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Note that while the aggregate supply of securi tirs A and B varied from period to period, 
srcurit.v C was a lw::1ys in 7-C'l'O ne t snpply. i\clditional ly, whil r no short sA.lPs were permitted 
in A and B, players were a llowed to short up to 8 units of C. Thus, the abili ty to buy A and 
B is not limited by the number of fra ncs on hand. If a subject wishes to expa nd holdings 
beyond the bounds indicated by the rndowment of francs, she could do so by selling uni ts of 
C a nd paying the dividend. A sale of C is equivalent to borrowing an a mount equal to Lhe 
sale price, in exchange for a repayment of 100 francs at the r nd of the period. To the buyer, 
the diffcrence between the price paid and the dividrnd is a riskfrre return since the payment 
is gua ranteed. This sale and purchase of asset C determines the risk-free rate simultaneously 
with the rates of return on the risky securities. Since it is possible for players to lose money 
clue to unfortunate draws of the state and to then declare bankruptcy, we needed to ensure 
the integri ty of the incentive system . Any subj ect who lost money in two consecutive periods 
in an experimental session was asked to leave the experiment. 
The initial allocations varied widely from experiment to experiment, as detailed in Ta-
ble 3.1. ·while players were aware of their own initial allocations, they were not told the 
allocations of others. T herefore, thc size of t he market portfolio was unknown to any player. 
T his is an important design consideration. As discussed in t he previous section , it ensured 
that participants could not usc the CAP:\I and Arrow-Debreu pricing model to deliberately 
set prices, thereby artificially generating the outcomes that we were looking for. 
Subj ects were informed t hat the experiments would last about three hours. Before as-
sembling in the Caltcch Socia l Science Experimental Laboratory, a ll subjects were given a 
URL with the instructions. At the end of each page of instructions is a short quiz, which had 
to be correctly completed before moving on to the next page (The instructions and quizzes 
can be found in Append ix A). Once all pages were completed , subjects were given a URL 
for a practice experiwent. Subjects were uut allowed to participate in the three- hour iu lab 
experiment if they did not enter at least five practice bids in the practice experiment. Each 
su bject who complcted t h«:se tasks a nd arri ved at t he lab on- t ime received a $10 bonns to 
their final payoff. 
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3.5 The Combined-Value 'frading (CVT) Mechanism 
\\'e us0d a Combined-Value Trading (CVT ) system in our exp<'rinwnts. In t his environment, 
subj0c-t i submits an order of the form (b;, 7/i, Fi) , read "i is ,,·illing to pay up to fbi forth<' 
v0ctor of goods J7/ i, for any f b0twccn Fi and 1." \iVith bids o f this form , determining the 
payments (prices) and allocations t hat maximize gains from trade (surplus) and provide the 
incentives for traders to reveal their true willingness to pay is not as straightforward as in 
singlc-assPt markets. 
In our implementation , we a llowed for a variety of order types. A multi-market order 
for agent 'i is a ,·ector < b; , q;t, qp, qf, Fi > where bi > 0 means agent i is willing to pay 
at most bi to buy the order and bi < 0 means agent i is willing to accept at least bi for 
the order. Simila rly, q{ > 0 llt<'aus agc·ut ·i wants to purchase up to q{ uuits of j in the 
order, and q{ < 0 m eans agent i wants to sell up to qf units of j in the order. Fi is a scale 
f11ctor (0 S Fi S 1) which indi r.atcs that agcnt i is willing to aer.ept an order of the form 
< fi · bi, f iq[1, fiql3 , fiqf > whcr<' fi E [Fi, 1] . For an "all or none" bid , Fi = 1. 
Orders for single securities can thereby easily be combined in one order as a package 
(portfolio) . For example, a package orcl<>r can specify a willingness to pay up to 1000 francs 
for 4 units of asset A. 2 units of ass0t B and 3 units of ass0t C, with full flexibility. This 
bid would be written < 1000, (4, 2. 3), 0 >. One form of packaged orcl<'r is a swap, buying 
uni ts of som<' ass0ts and s0lling units of othcr asscts. For example, a swap can specify a 
willingness to pay up to 100 francs to supply 3 units of asset A if and only if 1 unit of asset 
B is r<'ceiv<'cl , as well as a willingn0ss to a cc0pt any scaled version of this bid. This bid would 
b<' < - 100, (3, -1, 0), 0 >. Not<' that a lthough the market syst<'m will not a llow traders to 
bid more francs then t hey currcnUy possess, a packaged bid with asset C can overcome this 
problem. Suppose a player has zero francs and is willing to pa.v 90 francs to s upply of 1 unit 
of A for 2 units of B, < 90, (1, -2, 0) , 0 > .which is a bid he cannot afford. In order to cover 
this transaction , he can ofrcr to sell a uni t of asset C, effectively borrowing the 90 francs for 
a promise of 100 francs at the end of the period. I'\ ow, his bid is < 0, (1, -2, 1), 0 >, which 
is wit hiu the player 's budget constraint. 
After the bids are called, W<' solv<' for the a llocations and ma rk<'t prices. We \viii now usc 
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i to d enote orders as opposed to agent identification to r<'duce the notat ional burdens. T he 
alloration at C'ach i tNaJ ion is c!C' t Nm i n<'d by soh· i ng rlw i nt<'gN program: 
m ax J, I:, lbd j, 
su bject to I:i qf.fi :S 0 , k = A ,B,C 




Note that the first constraint implies that the mark<'t will admit a net surplus. If there is 
a s urp lus of a n asset in the solu tion , the ma rket offers iL for sale at t he m a rket price in Lhe 
next round of t he period. 
While solving tlw allocation problem is fair ly straightforward , calculaJing appropriate 
mar-ket pr-ices is not as simple. After t h <' a llocatio n is computed in the abO\·e m aximizat ion 
probl<'m, we knO\\" \\·hich bids will be matched a nd complrtcd. But we a lso need to compute 
what each matched bid will pay or rccein~ . T hat is, W<' need lo compute the transaction 
pric<'s. T he principles we used in designing the pricing rule were thal, (i) pay ments <'qual 
rcn•ipts a mo ng th e bidders, (i i) no on e pays m o re ( rcc<.'ives k ss) th a n she bid (offered ), 
(ii i) there ar<' incenti\·es to re v<'al one·s tnt<' willing n<'ss to pay, and (iY) everyone pays t he 
samr pric<' p<'r uni t unl<'ss there ar<' s ig nificant reasons for d eviating. As w<' wi ll see bC'low, 
cl<'viations fro m these principles will occur o nly in cas<'s with important infkxibilities. 
After the a llocation problem is solved , t here arc t hree categories of orckrs : (i) orders 
that were accepted by t he a llocation , (ii ) orders t hat were r-ejected by t he allocation, a nd 
(ii i) orders that were JHtTtially accez;ted (that is, 0 < ft < 1. where ft is t he fraction 
of ordrr i act ua lly a llocated) . \ V<' treat t he acccpt<'d part as a n accept<'d order and t he 
r<'j<'ct<'d part as a r ej<'Ct<'d orciN. A li t. tl0 C'('Onomics w ill now !.rtk~ liS a long way. T hink 
abou t the entir<' collection of submitted orders as a quasi-linear economy a nd ask what a 
mark<'t equilibrium (a competitiYe equilibrium ) would look like. lL is easy to show that , if a 
comp<'titiv<' eq uilibrium a llocat ion ancl pric<' YC'Ctor p exist, th<'n the a llocatio n would solve 
the maximization prohlt'lll a bow a nd the prin•:-; 7J (one price for t'ach item) would sol w the 
following problem: 
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b; - p · q, 2: 0 for all acecptcd orders 
b, - p · q, ~ 0 for a ll rejected orders 
p · I::i E A Cf i = 0 (Walras' law) 
If such an equilibrium prier rxist s, it would satisfy our principles and would be the natural 
prier to set. Unfor tunately. nei t hcr the uniqueness nor the existence of such a price vector 
p is gua ranteed. If t he market rquilibrium prices exisl bul a re uoL unique, there arc many 
ways to pick one. \Ve usc a reference pricing rule, which minimizes the difference between 
t lw rq11ili bri11m price a nd thr rdr rrncr price su hj ect to satisfaction of our principles. 
Non-existence is a deeper probiC'm requiring somewhat more fin esse. These problems 
can occur when subj ects submit bids with flexibility levels other than zero. This causes 
a nonconvcxi ty of the player 's prr Cr n•nccs, which may in t urn lead to non-exis tence of an 
equilibrium. To see why, considr r t hr rxample in Table 3.2 , as well as the corresponding 
Figure 3.2 , which deta il a bid schedule for a single asset . Suppose that bid 7 is to sell 3 
uni ts for at least 3 francs prr unit a nd is an inflexible order. Furthr r suppose bid 2 is to 
pa.v up to 4 francs per unit for 3 uni ts a nd is fully flex ible. Last ly, suppose bid 3 is to pay 
up to 2 fra ncs per unit for 2 uni ts , a lso flexibly. Surplus is maximized , given the flexibili ty 
constraints, if bids 1,2,3,5,6, and 7 arc filled (3 is par t ia lly filled ) . There is, however , no 
competi tive equilibrium. To sec t his, notice that a t a ny price a bove 2 fra ncs per uni t bidder 
3 i:-; umYilling to buy tmi ts , and at any price below 3 per unit bidder 7 is unwilling to :-;ell 
any units. There is no price such that demand equals supply, because the supply function 
r ffr rt in•ly jumps whrrc th f' cl <>ma ncl f11n ction woulcl rross it. 
To prier the alloration wlH' n a markrt rquilihrium prier clors not exist , we constmrt a 
"psruclo-competi tive rquilibrium prier." First, we ignore re.icctecl orders a nd consider only 
thr accC'ptccl orders . i.e., orders i such t hat ft > 0. Vo/r t hr n calcula te a fully flexible 
a llocation by maximizing the surplus, subject to no excess dema nd , with ft E [0, 1]. This 
is the a llocation lhal wou ld occ ur if a ll acccplcd orders were fully flexible. :'-!ext , we find 
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Tablr 3.2: Examp le of a set of orclr rs genera ti ng the supply-demand schedule m 
F igur<' 3.2. 
Bid :\lu mber Units O ffe red P rice 
1 2 5.0 
2 3 -1.0 
3 2 2.0 
4 2 1.0 
5 -1 0.5 
6 -2 1.5 
7 -3 3.0 
8 -3 3.5 
prices for t his a llocation exactly as we did before; spli tting t he d ifference if t he competitive 
equili brium price is not uniq ue. (In t his case it is easy to show a n equilibrium price will 
exist.) In the case of our example in Ta ble 3.2, this Illl'<UlS t hat liH' price is 3.50 fraucs; the 
price that wo uld obta in if a ll orders were fully flexible (Fi = 0, Yi). 
But if W<' wrrc to cha rg<' a nd pFly C'\"<' ry hid accord ing to t lw pric0 o f 3.50, buyer 3 woulcl 
be paying m ore t ha n t he maximum her bid indicated she was willing to pay per uni t (2 
fra ncs). Furt her, even t hough seller 7 created t he non-existence pro blem by requiring h is bid 
b r a li-or-none, he would receive a surplus o f 0.30 fra ncs on t he extra uni t sold that way. To 
pro\· ide the rig hL inccnt i \·cs, lo minim izc a ll-or-no ne bids where t hey a rc unnecessary, a nd lo 
no t over-cha rge or under-pay, we cha rge or pay each pa r t of a n originally accepted bid t hat 
was reject0d in the fully flexible allocatio n 0xact ly \-vhat t hey bid . So in Table 3.2, seller 7 
will receive 3 francs for t he lasl unit and buyer 3 will pay 2 francs fo r her unit. 
We may s till have a problem . If seller 7 receives 3 fra ncs for t he last unit sold a nd buyer 
3 pays 2 francs for t he uni t bo ught. we will have to pay o ut more t ha n we receive. In fac t , 
the a rea indicated as negative surplus in Figure 3 .2 is exactly the a mount we will be short. 
Let 1 ·J <lcnott' t he surplus from t hP fu lly flexible allocation, 1'* denot e the surplus fro m t he 
origina l m a tching proccdurr . and let d1' = 1'1- 1'*, the added surplus from flexibili ty. T his 
d1 · is 0xactly the negat iYe surplus in F igure' 3.2. \Ve need to coll0ct this a mount from those 
b ids accep!<'d in both t he origina l and in t he fully flexible a llocation . T here a rc m any ways 
t.o carry out this accommoda tioll o f the inflexible biclclcrs . \ Ve choosr to cha rge t he p layer 
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F igure 3.2: Supply-Demand graph generated by bidbook 111 Table 3.2. The shaded area 
represents the deficit caused by player 7's inflexibili ty. 
t hat caused the accommodation to be necessary. In this case, dV = 1 franc. Charging this to 
seller 7 still leaves him better off than if he hadn't traded at a ll , and brings the market into 
balance. It is possible that even after charging the inflexible players for t heir accommodation, 
the market could ~till be out of balance. In thi~ ca~e, it become~ nece~~ary to ~plit price~­
That is, we charge different prices to the buyers and sellers, with the aggregate difl'erence 
designed to make' up the m:nket deficit.. 8 
It is important to note that there may be trading rounds in which no transactions take 
place. In these cases, t he mechanism calculates prices at which no bid would want to trade 
because it would ma ke negative profi ts. These prices take the lack of trade as a signal that 
the current allocatiou is a competitive equilibrium, aud geuerates prices which suppor t i t 
in the same manner as detailed above. This is to ensure that even when no trade occurs, 
subjects receive informa,tion about the markets that enable tmde to occur in t he futme. 
ROf the 412 rounds in our experiments, there were only eight instances where accommodation was neces-
sary because of inflex ibilities . 
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The above may seem an extremely complex way to ma tch and price combined value 
tn=tcks. It is m:1cle pmticn larly cl iffi cnlt when one a llows a ll-or-none tracles. Bnt the com-
plexity is invisible to the agents, and is merely meant to provide them with clear signals: 
execution of trades as well as prices that reflect the economics of the situation. The success 
of the CVT mechanism is ultimately an empirical question. vVe measure its success in terms 
of Lhc liquidity il genera tes in thin markets. We now turn lo the results. 
3.6 Results 
'Ne will discuss four aspects of the experimental outcomes: companson of equilibration 
between CVT experiments and experiment:; with parallel markets, pa LLem s iu volume (liq-
uicli ty) , formal tests of equilibration, and final holdings. 
3.6.1 Equilibration 
As described earlier, eqnili hration of financial markets will be measnred using the predictions 
of the CAPM and the An ow-Debreu pricing model. As far as the CAPM is concerned, we 
examine the dynamic evolution of the difference between t he maximal Sharpe ratio and that 
of the market portfolio. To measure the Sharpe ratio, we wait until at least one transaction 
has occurred in each market. Using the most recent transaction prices, we compute the 
maximum Sha rpe ratio as well as the market 's Sharpe ratio, and take t he difference. T his 
is then repeated after any call in which a transaction occurs. T his produces a plot of the 
evolu tion of t he difference between the maximum Sharpe ra tio a nd that of the market. 
Figure 3.3 shows plots of t he Sharpe ratio differences for our seven experiments. 
With few exceptions, the (absolute) Sharpe ratios differences arc less than 0.15. T here 
is a tendency for the difference to be wider in earlier rounds of a period, but subsequently 
it narrows, which indicates that the markets equilibrate. However , in later rounds of a 
period the difference sometimes widens, which seems to imply tha t the ma rket moves off 
its equilibrium. We will document below that less trade occurs in later rounds of a period , 
making prices more sensit ive to the few orders t hat arc execu ted , or in the absence of trade, 
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the difference between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sha rpe 
ratio of the market portfolio. The theoretical maximum difference is zero. Time is measured 
in periods. 
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to the bid and ask prices. This causes the market to move away from CAP M equilibrium in 
later rounds. \Newill a,lso report tha,t reducin g the number of rounds forces tmding to occur 
earlier, implying that the prices in later rounds are no less arbitrary. This is confirmed in the 
last two frames of Figure 3.3, where t he number of rounds is seven instead of ten (December 
experiments). 
S ubjects did have t he tendency to submit orders that attempted to exploi t mis takes lha t 
others may have made. This was especially true for the riskfree asset (security C): while the 
t heoretical no-arbitmge price is 100, some subj ects invariably bid a low price for security 
C, and sometimes got it when others inadvertently submitted a low ask. When no orders 
for a security are filled (which occurred often in later rounds), the quoted price is affected 
by these bids (see the description of the mechanism in the previous section) . Because such 
specula tive bids did impact in particular the price of security C, we decided to ignore t he 
quoted prices for this security, and set its price equal to its no-arbitrage value (100). The 
Sharpe ra tios were computed on the basis of this theoretical price. 
It should be emphasized that equilibration is far from a foregone conclusion in our mar-
kets. Sub.iects did not know the composit ion of the market portfolio, and, hence, could not 
use the CAPM to price securi t ies, or to determine optimal investment stra t egies. As fa r 
as the latte r is concerned , we will later present evidence on subject 's actual end-of-period 
holdings. 
We set out to study how well our CVT m echanism docs relative to the usu al syst em 
of parallel , continuous double a uctions with the same number of subjects. So far , the fig-
ures document that our experimental markets did generally equilibrate all the way towards 
CAPYI, unlike in the experiments reported in I3KP. Still , we would like to know the extent 
to which there is improvement. To gain persp ective, Figure 3.4 shows the evidence from 
the t hin-m arke t experiments ill BKP. The experimellls are coucatellated to fit ill one plot, 
so the t ime scale is much bigger. The difference with t he results from the CVT m echanism 
(Figure 3.3) is pronounced. Equilibration in the CVT mechanism genera lly occurs in t he 
early rounds of many periods, whereas equilibration in the thin-marke t continuous double 
auctions effect ively occurred only in t he later experiments, where only subj ects who had 
been in earlier sessions participated . 
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Distance from CAPM equilibrium: MUDA experiments 
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Figure 3.4: Evolut ion of the difference between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe 
ratio of the market portfolio for in thin market experiments with parallel double auctions. 
The experiments are concatenated to fi t in one plot. 
As a furth er benchmark, Figure 3.5 plots the evolution for the thick-market experiments 
111 BP. Again, the experiments are concatenated. T he thick-market experiments generally 
produce Sharpe raLio difrereuces of t he same maguitude as t he CVT m arkets (iu Lhe rauge 
0 to -0. 2), but require far m ore trade (between 18 and 65 subjects participated). So, both 
thickening and a change in the market structure facilitate ecptilibration. 
Figure 3.6 provides evidence on t he second prediction that asset pricing t heory m akes, 
namely, t hat state-price probabili ties should be ranked inversely to t he aggregate wealth in 
the corresponding state. From the payoff matrix and t he aggregate a llocation of securities 
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of the difference between the maximum Sharpe ratio and the Sharpe 
ratio of the market portfolio for in thick market experiments with parallel double auctions. 
The experiments are concatenated to fit in one plot. 
(Table 3.1) , one can infer that aggregate wealth was highest in state Y and lowest in state 
X, implying that the state-price probability of state X be highest, and that of Y be lowest. 
The figure generally coufirrns this predictiou. T here arc a berrations, but it is not clear how 
significant these are. Any formal test would run into the difficulty that the prediction is only 
orctinal, and that the source of the randomness is not obvious. Later on , we introduce one 
a pproach to formally determine the significance level of the visual evidence. 
Again, the finding that state price probabilities generally rank as predicted by the theory 
is not a foregone conclusion, because subjects did not know aggregate wealth, and hence, 
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F igure 3.6: State-price probabilities for the ::;even experiments. The payoffs and allocations 
were such that t he state Y yielded t he highest aggregate wealt h and state X the lowest. 
T herefore, state X should have the highest state-price probability and state Y the lowest . 
Values outside of th e [0,1] interval indicate a clear a rbitrage opportuni ty. 
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could not determine the equilibrium ranking of state-price probabilities (if they cared at all) . 
3.6 .2 Volume 
Figure 3. 7 depicts the evol u tiou of volume (in francs traded per subject) over time. In the ten-
round experiments (November experiments), volume remains even over the first six rounds, 
and declines subsequently. Cross-inspection with F igure 3.3 reveals that. equi libration (if it 
occurs) generally completes before round six, and hence, before volume declines. This means 
that the reduction in liquidity (volume) in later rounds could on ly reflect exhaustion of gains 
from trade. In the seven-round experiments (December experiments), volume declines after 
two rounds, but does uoL dry up subsequeutly. Agaiu, cross-iuspectiou wilh Figure 3.3 
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Figure 3.7: Per Capita Transaction Volume (in Francs), by round , averaged across periods 
and experiments. 
We postulated tha t the CVT mechanism induces liquidi ty in thin experimenta l financial 
markets because subj ects can rebalance portfolios more easily. To verify t hat subjects do 
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ill deed avail themselves of the added portfolio trading flexibili ty provided by CVT, Figures 3.8 
::tnd 3.9 report. the percent.::tge of orders suhmi t.ted that. are r:omhined-valt1e (meaning th::tt 
they involve at least two securities, as opposed to orders for one security against cash only). 
Both by round and by period , between 20% and 30% of the orders a re combined-value. T he 
vast majority of these combined-value orders happen to be swaps (exchange of one or more 
securi ties for anoLher). 
10 
Round 
F igure 3.8: Percent of bids submit ted and accepted by subjects that involve at least two 
securi ties, by round. Note t hat submitting a combined-value bid docs not decrease the 
likelihood of Lhe bid's acceptance. 
The success of our portfolio trading mechanism is further gauged in the finding that 
combined-value bids are no less likely to transact than a rc s ingle-asset bids. Figures 3.8 
and 3.9 report that the percentage of orders accepted that are combined-value is about 
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F igure 3.9: P ercent of bids submit ted and accep ted by su bjects that involve at least two 
sec-uri t ics, by period. 
3.6.3 Formal Tests of Equilibration 
So far, we have produced graphical e\·ide nce of equilibratio n. Such evidence docs not reveal 
its siguificauce . To gauge the significance, we are going to introduce a statist ical test that 
forma lly distinguishes two hy p ot heses: (i) prices are unpredictable, i.e ., they form a random 
walk (the null hypothesis), a nd (ii ) prices a rc driven by th0 economic forces predicted by 
asset pricing theory, i.e., t hey arc att racted by equilibrium (the a lternative hy p othesis). The 
test effect ively asks: what are t he cha nces that we read too much asset pricing t heory in the 
data when in fact there is nothing goi ng on besides speculation. Sp eculat ion wi ll eliminate 
arbitrage opportunities, ami, if subj ects are risk neutral, wi ll cause prices to behave like 
random walks. Even if prices arc a ra ndom walk, with only t hree securi t ies it is likely 
t lwJ t lw m a rkct port folio accidcnt.a lly becomes mean-variance cffi cic n t as predicted by t he 
CAPM, or LhaL state-price probabili t ies happen to rank in accordance with Arrow-Debreu 
eq uilibrium. \Ne want to rule o ut t hat o ur observat ions arc cases of mere luck. Let us first 
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consider formal tests of the CAPM. 
Testing Random Walk Pricing Against The CAPM 
We take the random walk hypothesis as the null, and test it against the hypothesis that the 
market is pulled towards the CAPM . Our test works as follows. Let 6:.rvr,t denote the distance 
between lhe Sharpe ratio of the ma rket and the maximum Sharpe ralio, t he subscript L 
d<'uotiug t illle (period aud round). Consider the projection of the ch a nge in 6..r-.t.t onto 
6..A/,i- l: 
(3.4) 
where "' is such that E1. is uncorrelated with t:::..AI ,t - l· CAPM implies t:::..Ar,r. = 0; convergence 
to CAPM pricing implies "' < 0. We then determine t he distribution of the least squares 
estimates of "' under the nu ll hypothesis of a random walk, by randomly drawing from 
(bootstrapping) the empirical joint distribution of changes in transaction prices. The null 
hypothesis of a random walk is rejected in favor of stochastic convergence to CAPM if t he 
least squares estimate of"' is be:vond a cri tical value in the left tail of the ensuing distribution. 
This testing procedure is a variation of indir-ect infer-ence (see [15]): we summarize the data 
in terms of a simple statistica l model (in our case, a least squares projection) and determine 
the dislribution of the estimates by simulating the variables entering the statistica l model. 
Instead of simulating off a t heoretical distribution, we bootstrap the empirical distribution, 
how0.ver. 9 
For each experiment, we estimated "' using OLS. We determined 5% and 10% critical 
values under the random walk null hypothesis by bootstrapping from the empirical joint 
distribution of price changes (we generated 200 price series of the same length as the sample 
used to estimate "'). 10 
Table 3.3 reports the results. The null of a random walk is rejected in five of our experi-
ments. It is not surprising that we fail to reject the null in two of our experiments. To see 
9 (14] also uses indirect inference, but, instead of matching an a r bitrary statistical model, t hey match the 
scores of the likelihood function. 
10 \Ve hootstmppPrl thf' mf'an-mrrectf'd f' mp irir.al distrihntion , in orrlf'r to stay with the null hypothesis of 
a random walk. 
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why, look at the plots in Figure 3.3. The lovember 4 Sharpe ratio distance behaves itself as 
a mnoom walk. In th0- OV0-mlwr 30 Sf'SSion the volatility is so low that given th0- opening 
prices one could easily have stuck on the frontier accidentally. In the five experiments in 
which we can reject t he null of the random walk, the statistical analysis indicates that there 
is only a tiny probability to accidentally obtain , for instance, the plots in Figure 3.3 if prices 
were iudeed a random walk. 
Table 3.3: Test of Random Walk Pricing Against CAPl\11 Equilibrium 
Experiment Attraction Coefficient r;, 
Estimate" Critical Valueb 
5% 10% 
11/01/99 - 0.0893* -0.1086 -0.0789 
11/04/99 -0.0400 -0.1335 -0.1028 
11/ 11/99 -0.3900** -0.1153 -0.0662 
11/ 16/99 -0.3700** -0.0978 -0.0702 
11/30/99 - 0.0300 -0.0942 -0.0786 
12/ 02/99 - 0.2900** -0 .1325 -0.0818 
12/07/99 -0.2800** -0.1001 -0.0812 
aMeaning of superscripts: ·• = significant at the 5% level, * = sign if-icant at the 10% level. 
bBasecl on 200 bootstrapped samples of the same size as used Lo estimate "-· 
The rejections of the random walk hypothesis reported in Table 3.3 do not imply that 
the subjects ignored profit opportunities from speculating on price changes. This is because 
our rejection of the random walk is based on information on which subjects could not con-
dition, namely lhe Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Recall that Lhis raLio is not readily 
determined from the history of price movements, as computation requires knowledge of the 
composition of the market portfolio. As emphasized before, subjects did not know this, and 
hence could not determine in which way prices would move when the market was sti ll out of 
equilibrium, even if they believed in t he CAPM. 
Testing Random Walk Pricing Against The Arrow-Debreu Model 
To a large extent. the graphical evidence in Figure 3.6 suggested that state-price probabil-
ities moved in the direction predicted by Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, even if t heir ranking 
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contrad icted the theory for long periods of time. One would like a formal test to confirm t he 
visual C'vid C'nCC' of .. mOY<'mrnt.·· Tn particular. on<' would like' to c!C't~rrnin<' wh8th~r indeed 
state-price probabilities adjust towards Arrow-Debreu equilibrium even when their ranking 
is not as predicted by the theory. \Ve again take random walk pricing as our null hypothesis. 
T hat is, we determine t he probability of observing the dynamics in state-price probabilities 
iu our experiments if prices were m erely r<tudom walks. U m.ler the a! tern aLive LhaL markets 
a re a t tr<tcted by Arrow-Debren equil i bri 11m, we expect speci fie ch<tngcs in the state-price 
probabilit irs wlw n thry <trr not a lignrd a ppropri<ttely. In pmticular, we expect the follow-
ing . Let Px,1, P)·,1 and Pz,t denote the t ime-t state-price probabili t ies for states X , } ' and 
Z , respective ly. Recall that t hese should b <' ranked inversely to the aggregate vvealt h in each 
state, n<tmcly Px ,t > P7-.t > P)). T ime is measured in number of transactions. 
Ranking of State-Price 
Prouabili t ics at L 
Px,t > p).,t > Pz,t 
Px ,t > Pz ,t > P)', t 
p) .,t > Px,t > Pz,t 
Pv,t > Pz .t > Px.t 
Pz,t > P)',t > Px,t 
Pz,t > Px,t > P)',t 
Expected E ffect 
(Pz ,t+t - p).,t+,) - (Pz,t - P\',t) > 0 
Anything is Possible' 
(Px,t+L- P\',t+t) - (Px ,t- Pv.t) > 0 
(Px,t+L - P)-,t+t)- (Px ,t - P)',,,) > 0 
or (Pz ,t+l - P)',t+t) - (Pz,t - P)',t) > 0 
(Px,t+t - PY,t+t) - (Px ,t - P)',t) > 0 
(Px ,t+t - Pz,t+L) - (Px ,t - Pz,t) > 0 
These predictions are weak, because they only concern t he sign of the cha nge in the difference 
between two state price probabilities. The question is: a rc economic forces strong enough 
that the expected effects can be detected sharply? 
As test statistic, we compu te the frequency of observing (trans it ioning to) the expected 
0 11 teo me for 0ach stat<' (ran king of state-price proba bi I i ties). 'vVe sn bsPqltent ly averagP across 
states. The aYeraging is mandated by t he fact t hat, in finite samples, not a ll states need 
occur, in which case some transition freq uencies a rc undefined. Let 1r denote the mean 
transition frequency. Notice that the second frequency will always be 1 (100%). 'vVe include 
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this frcqu0ncy, so that outcomes where t he Arrow-Debrcu prediction holds (Px,t > Pz,t > 
Pv,t) rcrein~ more weight. Tn analogy with our formal test of the CAP M, we compnte t he 
distribution of n under the null hypothesis by bootstrapping t he empirical joint distribution 
of price changes in each experiment (we generated 200 price series of the same le ngth as the 
sample used to estimate n). 11 Table 3.4 reports the results. In addi t ion to the estimated 
mean transition frequencies (second column), we report 5%, 90% and 95% cri t ical values 
under the null of random walk pricing. 
Table 3.4: Test of Random Walk Pricing Against Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium 
Experiment Mean Transition Probabili ty n 
Estimate" Critical Valueh 
5% 90% 95% 
11/01/99 0.9056** 0.237 0.7896 0.8266 
11/04/09 0.7460 0.3692 0.8077 0.8732 
11/11/99 0.9000** 0.5259 0.8576 0.8896 
11/16/99 0.8605** 0.2542 0.7874 0.8082 
11/30/99 0.7667 0.4109 0.8748 0.8909 
12/02/99 0.7568 0.4614 0.8572 0.8798 
12/07/99 0.5220 0.2182 0.6153 0.6662 
ai\ Ican ing of superscripts: •• = significant at the 95% level 
bBased on 200 bootstrapped samples of t he same size as used to estimate 1r. 
The m agnitude of the estimated m ean t ra nsition frequencies allow us to reject Lhe null in 
only t hree of our experiments . Upon examination of F igure 3.6, t he results are not surprising. 
The state-price probabilities on November 4 arc genera lly properly ranked. On November 30, 
we witnessed an interesting phenomenon . Alt hough a ll three states were equally likely, state 
Z never occurred in t his session. By t he fourth period, subjects seem to have believed t hat 
this state was "due," and therefore gave it a higher probability weight than warranted. This 
phenomenon is also observed in t hick-market experiments. See BP for fur t her discussion. 
vVitl! the exceptiou of the December 7 sessiou , the critical values are quite h igh . There 
are pronounced differences across experiments in terms of beginning prices and empirical 
11 .We bootstrapped t he mean-corrected empirical distribution, in order to stay with the null hypothesis of 
a random walk. 
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distribution of price changes, which translate into marked differences in t he distribu tion of 7f 
nncl0r t h0. nnll of a random walk. :'-Jotc that if the initial price configuration satisfi es or is clos0. 
to satisfying t he Arrow-Debreu equilibrium restriction , t he simulated 7fS will be high (the 
predicted outcome if r x ,t > r z,t > r Y,t obtains with unit frequency). This expla ins the high 
level of the 5% cri t ical value most of our experiments. Our procedure penalizes experiments 
thal happen Lo start out with prices lhat satisfy Arrow-Debreu equilibrium resl ricLions. 
Overall t hen , Table 3.4 does provide form al evidence that Arrow-Debreu equilibrium predicts 
price movements in experimental financial markets bet ter than the random walk hypothesis. 
Again, t he rejections of the random walk hypothesis reported in Table 3.4 do not imply 
that the subjects ignored profit opportuuities from speculating on price changes. This is 
because our rejection of t he random walk is based on information that subjects could not 
condition on, namely, the distribu lion of aggregale wealth across states. 
3.6.4 Final Holdings 
We already pointed to one conunonali ty with the t hick-markets experiments reported in 
BP, namely, markets fully equilibrate. There is another commonali ty. In BP, the end-of-
period securi t ies holdings of subj ects were investigated . CAPM theory predicts that subj ects 
should a ll hold risky securi t ies in the same proportion, namely, the proportion given by t he 
market portfolio. The reason is simple: the market portfolio is the optimal portfolio of 
risky securities in the CAPl\1 equilibrium. BP documents t hat subj ects' holdings arc not 
as predicted by the theory, and even rnore puzzling, that there is no convergence towards 
the theoretical predic t ion in later periods. This is particularly paradoxical, because the 
pricing result (CAP M pricing) is generally understood to depencl critically on the allocational 
prediction: the market portfolio becomes mean-variance optimal only because every agent 
demands mean-variance optimal portfolios. 
We discover the same pricing-allocation paradox in the CVT experiments . Figure 3.10 
plots the holdings of risky securi l ics in one of t he experiments (December 7). The compo-
sition of the market por tfolio is indicated with circles. Subjects' positions generally differ 
markedly from t h0 market p ortfolio, and the differences clo not diminish in later prriods. 
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Furthermore, there is no correlation between those subject's who hold well-balanced portfo-
lios and those who take <-ldvantage of the hids admitted hy thr CVT. This obviously hegs the 
question: why is it that the market portfolio is priced to be mean-variance optimal , while 
subjects obviously are not holding mean-variance optimal portfolios? 
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Figure 3.10: Percent of wealth allocated to asset A in both the market and individual 
portfolios for the December 7 experiment. Circles represent t he market portfolio. While the 
market portfolio is ncar optimality, individual subjects ' holdings are quite extreme. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we report results from seven small-scale experimental financial markets where 
order submission and trading took place t hrough a portfolio trading mechanism - the 
combined-value trading (CVT) system. The results were compared to those from earlier 
experiments when markets were organized as a set of parallel double auct ions. The new 
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mC'chanism e liminated the tendency of the equilibrat ion process to stop short of t he equilib-
rium. Volume did not disappear before t he market reached full eqiiilibriurn. Distance from 
equilibrium was mcasnred relative to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 
Our results suggest that, to avoid illiquidity in t hin (small-scale) financia l markets, a 
portfolio trading mechanism should be used . The link between volume and portfolio t rad ing 
is predicted by asset pricing theory, which posits lhat agents are not interested in securities 
individually, but in portfolios (p ackages of securities). Unconnected, para llel double a uctions 
do not allow agents to readily trade np to desired p ortfolio compositions, unless markets are 
sufficiently thick. 
This pa per confirms a conj ectured link between liquidity and equilibration. The finding 
has implicat ions for empirical studies of asset pricing, where illiquid assets are often t hought 
of as generating an "equilibrium liquiuity premium" over and above the usual risk premium. 
In view of the re~mlts of this paper, it is odd to t hink abou t an equilibrium liquidity pre-
mium, because illiquid markets appear to b e associated with markets that do not equilibrate, 
and hence, an equilibrium liquidi ty premium cannot be envisaged (nor can one think of an 
eq uilibrium risk premium). 
In many respects , the results reported m this paper resemble those from large-scale 
experimental markets with para llel double auctions. This includes the allocation-pricing 
paradox: while prices are found to converge to the predictions of general equilibrium asset 
pricing theory, final holdings a rc ma rkedly at odds with it. That is , the CVT m echanism 
is capable of generating the same qualitative results t hat one obtains in markets wi th a 
significantly larger number of subjects (19 to 63, instead of 6 to 15), at a significantly lower 
cost. 
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Chapter 4 An Empirical Analy sis of Combined-Value 
Markets in the RECLAIM Permit Trading Program 
4.1 Introduction 
For nearly thirty years, the efficient management of pollution abatement through market 
solutions has been a favorite topic of public economists. In the seminal paper in the field, 
Montgomery [27] establishes t he possibility that a tradable pollution permit system could 
effectively internalize the p ublic bad of ambient pollution. Emissions trading programs 
allow many facili t ies the fl exibility to choose t he most cost-effective mea,ns of ach ieving their 
emissions target. But , it wasn 't unti l t he 1990 C lean Air Act that the general public was 
aware of market-based approaches to environmental protection. Since then, several t rad ing 
systems for pollution permits have been launched a round the country. While t his paper will 
110t descril>e the detai ls a11d meri ts of market-based euvirorune11ta l regulations in general, it 
will explore t he implementation and performance of one of t hese m arkets in particular. 
Los Angeles is notorious for its poor air qna,lity. In the Clean Air Act it was the only 
region in the country classified as an extreme non-attainment area for exceeding t he Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone. Since then, t he South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (SCAQMD) has launched a program for t rading p ermits in Nitrogen 
a nd Sulfur Oxides (NOx and SOx) in the Los Angeles basin. This program, the REgional 
CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), was initia lized in October of 1993 and has been 
opernting since en rly 1994. The progmm pbced minimnl restrictions on how permits could 
be t rad ed. Nlost transactions are either cond ucted by a broker or through one of two permit 
m arkets. In this study, we will examine the trading patterns in one of these two markets, 
that run by the Automated Credit Exchange (ACE) in Pasadena, California .1 
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. AfLer discussing the design of RE-
1 We thank ACE for a llowing us access to their data. More information on ACE can be found at 
http:/ jwww.acemarket.com. 
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CLAi t\ I and the ACE market mechanism, we will discuss some predictions abou t a nd early 
r0sults from the mark0t. Then, we will explore t he overall market evolu t ion from Apri l 1996 
to t he present. We will look at pricing and participation data over the first four years of 
ACE trading. 'vVc will consider patterns within the individual assets, as compared relative 
to the proximity of the period in which they are valid. As will become clear, t here are really 
two markets operating in one mechanism; one for spot and short-Lerm permi t procurement 
and sales, and one for future planning. It is in t his latter market that t he sophistication of 
the ACE mechanism is crit ical. 
4.2 RECLAIM and ACE 
When RECLAIM was initial ized. it defined a market in Ox and SOx for a ll of the Los 
Angeles Basin. These two pollutants a rc particularly noxious as they contribute heavily to 
the ozone problem. By setting emissions caps for facilities and a yearly reduction mandate for 
that facility-wide cap, RECLALVI was adopted to provide facilities with added flexibility in 
meeting emission reduction requirements and to lower t he cost of compliance. The designers 
wanted to ensure that t hese caps reflected lypical (recession neu tral) production activity 
(at the t ime of the initial allocation , California's recent recession had caused many facilities 
to operate at, below average proclnction levels) . T herefore, they allowecl firms to set their 
facili t ies' initia l baselines on t he basis of actual (reported) emissions in one of four years 
between 1989 and 1992. T his cap then declines from 1994 to 2003, after which it is constant. 
The 2003 target goal is approximately 58% of 1994 reported SOx emissions levels ( 40% of t he 
ini t ia l RTC allocation) and 48% of lhe repot'Led Ox 1994 emissions levels (30% of the ini t ial 
RTC a llocation). A faci li ty is a llowed to emit pollutants up to the number of RECLAIM 
Trading Credits (RTCs) it has been issued. Additionally, they arc permitted to sell or 
purchase any surplus or deficit. A facili ty may clo so either through bilateral negotiation or 
through the marketplace. Tote that in contrast to previous emission reductions programs, 
there is no banking of RTCs . They are good for one year only. 
In order lo sm ooth lracling behavior, two cycles of permits were issued. A cycle one 
perwit for a give11 year is an effective credit between Janua ry 1 and December 31 of that 
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year, whereas a cycle two permit is effective July 1 to June 30 of the following year. Half of 
the partir:ipaJing firm s were assigned to each, hut they are free to move between the cycles as 
they see fit to cover their pollution. After the expiration of an RTC, firms have an additional 
60-day reconciliation period in order to review compliance and purchase any permits they 
still require. Additionally, separate permits were issued for each of two zones in the South 
Coast Air Basin. Zone one is for coastal polluters, a nd :tone two for inland. Because of the 
prevailing wind currents, coastal polluters arc forbidden to usc inland permits hut inland 
pollnt<'rs cnn nsr coastal p<'rmits. Any giV<'n RTC is only vnlid for the ycnr, cycle, zone, nnd 
pollutant for which it is designated. Initially, permits were issued for 1994 - 2010, which 
implies a total of 136 permits availabk in the initial market. 
The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market) to trade in 
quarterly trading scssions. 2 This mechanism is designed to alleviate some of the illiquidity 
caused by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market. The market 
mechanism used by ACE is based on research conducted at Caltcch in 1993.3 At the time 
of design , there had never previously been an operating combined-value call market. The 
mechanism allows bidders to submit contingent orders (I want A if and only if I can also 
secure B), matches revealed surplus, and calculates prices that leaves bidders at least as 
well off for having participated as if they had not. It is an iterative call market that picks 
a standing allocation at the end of each round, las ting a total of three to five rounds. To 
determine the exact number of rounds, ACE uses an improvement rule mandating that if 
surplus and volnme do not increase by at least 5% after each iteration , the market will end 
and transactions will be made based on the last iteration. 
Recently, t he ACE market has accounted for approximately 75% of non-zero price trades 
in the RECLAIM market, and this percent is increasing (as we will discuss in Section 4.4.) 
In 1999, RECLAIM recorded 239 nou-:tero price trades (219 in the NOx ma rket and 20 in 
the SOx market). ACE conducted 213 of these trades, 208 of which were for NOx permits. 
We are only interested in t rade for a price, since zero price trades are either inter-facility 
2 Although there are sometimes as many as five or s ix sessions per year, and recently monthly markets 
have begun 
3 For a deta iled description of the design a nd experimental tcstbccldin g of the ACE mechan ism , see Tshikicl a 
f't al. [ 19]. 
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or transfers to or from a permit broker, and a re therefore not truly part of the competitive 
mR.rkf't. vVe will use ACE data in this pap0r for two reasons. F irst., since it conducts 
the vast majority of priced trades in RECLAIM , it offers a rich environment in which to 
study the program. Second, since ACE is the first combined-value market of its kind , a 
careful examination of these data will tell us about the potential of combined-value market 
mechanisms for tradable pollution permit marke ts. 
We will examine both bidding and pricing behavior exhibited by the participants in ACE 
and the ACE market mechanism, respectively. We conduct this analysis both over the life 
of the ACE Markets and across the permit vintages. It is important to look at the two 
time trends separately. First, prices of a given future are increasing over time. This refl ects 
the decreasing number of RTCs available relative to reported emissions, as planned by the 
RECLAIM project. The second, is at any given session, price increases in the length of Lime 
until the RTC vintage is effective for covering emissions . For example, in 1995 the cheapest 
RTCs available were to cover emissions in 1995. The price for a 1996 RTC in the 1995 market 
was more expensive, and so on. Permits sold in 1995 for emissions beyond 1998 were fairly 
stable. We will discuss some reasons for this in Section 4.8. 
The ACE data explored in this paper cover the markets from April 1996 to January 
of 2000. ~i[arkets were held at- least quarterly, with some years having 5 or 6 markets. 
Specifically, the data are from the following auctions: April 1996, July 1996, August 1996, 
October 1996, February 1997, April 1997, July 1997, October 1997, January 1998, April 
1998, July 1998, October 1998, January 1999, April 1999, July 1999, August 1999, October 
1999, and J anuary 2000. Very recently, some pricing data have become available for the 
April 2000 market, and we will use these data when applicable. 
4.3 Predictions 
Karl Hausker , Chief Economist for the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, conducted extensive pre-market research on what we should expect from emissions 
trading programs such as RECLAIM. He suggested LhaL demR.nd and supply in spot and 
short-term markets arises from fluctuations iu load growth, plant availability, aud the price 
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and availability of various fuels. In the long-term market, demand and supply are driven 
hy load-growth and the need for nevv pl~111ts, and wo1Jid t lwrc:forP. likc:ly bP. for strP.ams of 
allowances and demand in the long-term market. The builder of a new plant would seck a 
10 or 20-year supply of permits in order to guarantee his planned production stream. In a 
similar fashion, a selling plant could generate a stream of surplus allowances at a later date. 
Iu t he former scenario, t he shorl-lcrm planner relics on the shor t-term marke t and accepts 
the risk of price changes. In t he la tter. he locks in prices by turning to the long-term 
market. HauskP.r commented t ha t , "In reali ty, the market is unlikely to func tion in this 
idealized manner. " His concern was that many sources of market inefficiency (cost-of-service 
regu lat ion, regulatory uncertainty, etc.) would tend to reduce tra nsactions. This reduction 
would be felt most acutely in the long- term market. Additionally, markets would be too 
thin, particularly in early years. lf firms sec allowances as a key to load growth , t he number 
of sellers in the long-term market would shrink more quickly than in the shor t-term markets. 
A risk-averse utili ty will be far more willing to sell allowances to be issued in the ncar future 
than to sell a 20-ycar s tream (much less a perpetual stream). 
Fur thermore, risk aversion plays a major role in environmental pla nning. In face of 
regulatory uncertainty, a player may want to avoid major changes in allowance holdings. 
This further encourages short-term buying and selling and discourages transactions in t he 
long term market. Additionally, the Public Utilities Commission must approve many long-
term changes at emitting facilities, and the approval process at the t ime of the transaction 
discourages long-term transactions relat ive to short- term ones. A trans;:tction in the long-
term market will typically involve a new plant or major emission-cont rol decision and involve 
far more money than a short-term transaction. Ironically, risk aversion would also make long-
term transactions a necessity, as a firm is unlikely to bu ild a new plant without possession 
of the necessary s tream of allowances. Silll ilarly, a polential seller would be unlikely to rely 
solely on short-term markets to help recoup its investment in emission control. Ha usker was 
concerned , t herefore, t hat long-term ma rket is most snsccptible to inefficiP.ncies. 
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4.4 Buy ing Patterns and the Evolution of the ACE 
Market 
The RECLAIM market is a very new one, and as such it is still evolving. As firms learn 
about the transaction costs and pricing inherent in the various trading options available 
to them, we expect to see movement of trade towards those outlets where trade is most 
easily facilita ted . T herefore, an important mPasure of the appeal of tlw various market 
(and non-market) mechanisms is the percentage of firms that chose one outlet for trading 
RTCs over another. The number of participants in the RECLAIM universe has not changed 
dramatically since its inception, and has in fact dcclincd. 4 As time progresses, more and 
more of the members of the R.ECLAHvl universe arc using the ACE markets than any other 
trading option , as the below description of Fignre 4.1 will demonstrate. 
When examined on a session-by-session basis, it appears that the number of pa rticipants 
in the markets is not changing over time. In the upper frame of Figure 4.1, we show the num-
ber of bidders and winners participating in the each session of the ACE markets from Apri l 
1996 to J anuary 2000. Even though the number of RECLAIM facilities has not dralllat ically 
changed over this time p eriod , the number of bidders and winners in the ACE markets is 
increasing when exa mined on a yearly basis. In fact , while only 10% of 1996 RECLAIM 
universe members conducted trades-for-a-price through ACE, 20% did so in 1999. Based on 
January 2000 data, we can exp ect ACE to conduct trades on behalf of 31% of RECLAIM 
universe members in 2000. This is even more dramatic when coupled with the fact that 
213 of 219 (over 97%) of trades for a price iu 1999 were conducted via ACE. As the RE-
CLAIM program progresses, environmental engineers learn that the non-market mechanisms 
for trading involve extreme transactions costs relative to the case and efficiency of the ACE 
market. As shown in the bottom frame of Figure 4.1, over time they arc more likely to trade 
with ACE. vVhy arc the number of participants, when considered on a session-by-session 
4 \Vhen RECLAIM was adopted, 394 facili t ies were ident ified as t he initial "universe." Between inception 
and June 30, 1998, 18 facilities have been included, G1 excluded, and 25 facilities have ceased operation. 
Thus Lhe RECLAIM universe consisted of 32G facilit ies on July 1, 1998. By the end of the 1998 compliance 
year (June 30, 1999), the RECLAIM universe contained 331 faci lities. See the SCAQMD Annual Report for 
further details [31)). 
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F igure 4.1: Part icipation in t he ACE market , by sessiou a nd by year 
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basis, so constan t, and the number of yearly participants increasing so dramatically? The 
two 8.111111 8.1 c:ydos est3hlishorl hy RECLAIM wen' rlesigned exR.ctly with this goR.l in minrl. 
That is, having two cycles has encouraged smoother trading behavior over the years, as was 
the intention. 
As discussed m Section 4.2, the combined-value mechanism employed in ACE allows 
bidders Lo express very com)Jlex preferences in Lheir bids. Figure 4.2 describes the percent 
of bids submitted and of t hose fulfill ed that R.rc for more than one asset (combined value 
or package bids) . Notic:c thaJ the number of padmge bids submit ted over t ime is relatively 
steady, and that package bids are roughly as likely to transact as a re single-asset bids. On 
average, 18% of bids subm itted are for packages, as a re 14% of fulfill ed orders. As we will 
sec later, we are far more likely to observe package bidding in t he long- term planning market 
Lhan in the short-term markeL. 
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Figure 4.3 shows t he repor ted emissions and total RTCs issued in both the NOx and SOx 
markrts . The initial supply of RTCs to th<" market was based on facility-chosen emission 
levels between 1989 and 1992. As you can see, the initial supply of RTCs was in excess of the 
emissions in 1994. The supply was reduced each year in order to achieve compliance with 
California and U.S. ozone standards. In 1997-98, the supply of "\fOx RTCs decreased below 
the levels declared in 1994 and this cross for SOx occurred in 1999. As F igure 4.4 shows, the 
volume of buy, sell , and swap bids subm itted to the ACE Market since its inception reflect 
the underlying supply and demand. With the exception of the first few trading sessions, the 
volume of sells is decreasing as the excess of RTCs over emissions decreases. 
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Figme 4.4: Number of buy, sell, and swap bids submitted , by session 
4.5 Pricing Patterns During Market Evolution 
One way Lo geL a beUer underst.amling of markeL parlicipanLs' behavior is by focusing ou 
a subset of the overall market activity. For the moment, we will focus on the market in 
t he most cmrent RTCs available for purchase, known as t he spot market. As previously 
mentioned and shown in Figure 4.3, the ini t ial supply of RTCs was in excess of the reported 
emissions at the market's inception in 1994. The supply of RTCs was reduced each year (an 
average of 8.3% per year for NOx and 6.8% for SOx), and in 1997-98 this supply dipped 
below Lhe LoLa! 1994 emissions level. AL t.l!is point. , prices began an uphill climb. Figure 4.5 
shows the evolution of the ::.J"Ox and SOx spot market price over the time period April 
1996 to .January 2000. As you will notice, there is almost no trade in any of the markets 
except for N Ox Zone 1 (we will discuss some reasons for this below), so henceforth we will 
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usc the data from this asset to demonstrate the patterns that emerge. As is evident, t he 
prirC' of RTCs dramatically i nc:r<'aSC'S short ly a.ftPr t lw <'XpC'rtC'd r ross of RTC ;wailnbi I i ty 
and reported emissions. HowcYer, ew11 this highest price fa lls quite short of the AQf\ID 's 
a nt icipated price of $11 ,257 per ton. Furthermore, the price acceleration we observe is far 
stcepC'r t han that predicted by economists prio r to market inception. We will discuss t hese 
pred ictio11s a nd the d iscrepancy beLwee11 them and Lhc real izecl prices now. 
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Figure 4.5: Spot market pric-ing in ACE markets, April 1996 to April 2000 
After the first two years of trading, Klier et al. [21] a uthored a study predicting patterns 
we might obsen ·e and examining the early data on I\Ox trad ing in the RECLAif\I program. 
They expected slow activity in t lw market at first, as t he initial a llocation of permits was well 
alwv<' tl1e reported emis:-:; ious IC'v<'ls (s<'t' Figure '-1.3). Additionally, they suggest a correlation 
betw0en t he price of RTCs and the marginal cost of pollutiou abatement, stemming from 
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the dual effect of the presence of permits in the market. Permits both decrease the marginal 
eost of pollution abatement and increase tlw m<1rginal eost of production (the latter effPet 
is because holding an RTC represents an opportunity cost to the firm). Therefore, the 
price of RTCs will always be less than or equal to the marginal cost of abatement at any 
production level. They find that in excess of 54% of t rading is for the permit just expiring 
(so, the majority of market activity is to balance the books). LasLly, Lhey predict that market 
activity will increase as the emissions ca p decreases over time. 
Prior to RECLAIM's implementation , .Johnson and Pekclney built the Emissions Trading 
Model (ETl'vi) to assess the potential economics and environmental impacts of RECLAIM's 
emissions trading program. It estimates trades that arc likely to occur under the program 
and links to a general equilibrium model of the regional economy. Figure 4.6 shows the 
predicted price patterns they expected to observe in the first few years of RECLAIM permit 
trading, translated to 1999 dollars. 
In reality, permit prices have not yet achieved these predicted levels. Figure 4.7 shows 
prices for various vintages of permits, both SOx and Ox, for zones one and two.5 As we 
can see (by comparing Figures 4.6 and 4.7), prices have stayed quite low. Assuming these 
prices accurately reflect the marginal control costs as argued in Section 4.3, it appears that 
the planning flexibility offered by the RECLAIM program resulted in lower than expected 
marginal control costs, perhaps from the shift to a facility-wide performance standard (sec 
Bohi & Burtraw [3] for an excellent discussion of the impacts on control costs). Additionally, 
prior to the start of RECLAIM, facilitir.s had incentive to misrepresent their emissions and 
true costs of abatement, as we will discuss below. However, April 2000 data indicates that 
prices are now approaching the predicted levels. The marginal cost of "Best Available Control 
Technology" (or BACT) for NOx is believed to be in the range of $3.50 to $4.50 per pound. 
The spot market price for permits iu the mosl recent (April 2000) market was $4.23. We are 
now just reaching the market transition point that the ETM believed would occur in 1996. 
Why is it that the SOx market has been so thinly traded a nd the prices are so much 
'' Decause there are two different RTCs that cover a given year (cycle one and cycle two), a compliance 
year is defined to be both cycle one and cycle two of that year. Therefore, there is a 6-month overlap between 
each a nnual data poin t. That is, 1998 comprises .Ja nuary 1, 1998, to .June 30, 1999. The RECLAIM data is 
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F igure 4.6: Prices predicted by the Emissions Trading 1\Ioclel (1999 dollars) 
r losC' r to prwlicted lewis (although st ill significantly lower)? Tn t he last 30 years, the Los 
Augdes area has engaged in an extremely aggressive SOx a batement program, and the levels 
of SOx emissions a re low and stable, particularly when compared to the NOx emissions levels. 
Furthermore. partially due to th is aggressive program, su lfur d ioxide abatement technology is 
wc•ll-cstablishcd. Siucc all SOx cruitten; are well aware of the available a batellleut tcdurology 
a nd have made their decision about abatiug versus procuring permits, there a re no lower-cost 
abatPrs in tlw pPrmit markC't to drivC' tra.dC' with highC'r-rost a ba t<'fs. 
On the ot her hand, the 1 Ox problem in Los Angeles and the lack of available effect ive 
abatement technology was still a major issue at the inception of the RECLAIM market. 
Technology is still advancing, and as it docs so, t he technology gap between firms drives 
trade. Additionally, prior to the existence of the permit t rading program, source owners 
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Figure 4. 7: R<'alized prices of Yarious vintag<'s of RTCs in 1998 and 1999 
had little incentive to reveal the lrue cosl of abatemenl; indeed lhe incen tive historically 
has been to overstate the control costs during public hearings in order to defi ect proposed 
command-and-control type regu lations. This s trategic reporting further accounts for the gap 
between pred icted and actual RTC prices. 6 
4 .6 Bidding and Trading Time Horizon 
In <'nch session, there arc over 100 assets available for pnrrhasc. Because at any given time, 
a trading session allows trading for permits spanning at least the next decade, these m:vriad 
<wailable assets a re constantly changing. If we consider the RTC as different assets because 
6Existing source dema nds for RTCs is projected over time and a rc based on historical reported emissions 
undt•r the comma nd-and-control system. 
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thr elate' of dfrctiYeness is diffcr0nt, we have a very thin data set from ,,·h ich it is difficult to 
pC'rcriYP n pricing pattern. Rat.lwr, wC' consicler these not as clatPd objects (in terms of thC'ir 
year of va lidity) but as a s tream of futu re contracts dated relative to the current market. 
O nce we make this adjustment a nd consider the permits in terms of their rela tive vintage, 
patterns emerge that indicate there a rc really two markets in one here. The b idding patterns 
aud pri<.:es in lhe spot and short-term markel arc in stark cont rast lo Lhose exhibi ted by the 
long-lerm planning market. Wr will 0xplore these differencrs now. Vl/c will on ly consider the 
spot and fntures markC'ts up to 17 prrmits in the fnturr (for a total of 9 years of forward 
contracts in a ny giYen trad ing scssion).7 
T here is a significant stream of fu tures availa ble to a RECLAUd trader . I t is not clear , 
howevrr , t hat a ll traders ta ke advantage of t his futures market . As ment ioned earlier , t he 
va L majori ty of bids and lradcs arc in the spol market. In facl, the number of bids entered 
is inversely proportional to t he Lime horizon. In F igure 4..8, we show the number of bids and 
fnl fi llecl orders in the market as a function of the vintage of the earliest item in the bid. As 
we will sec, t he shor t-term, heavily traded market exhibits quite different attributes than 
thr long-term. They operate as two simultaneous, but distinct, markets in one. 
4.7 Bidding Behavior 
T he ACE market is a powerful institution, allowing for bids that descri be very complex prcf-
crC'ncrs. Arc the bidders using these opt ions, or are the complex bidding features of the ACE 
mechanism simply window-trimming? Ishikicla et a l. [19] provides a detailed explanation as 
lo Lhc moli,·ation a firm may have to submit conLingenl bids. The myriad options a finn 's 
em·ironmental engineer faces present a very complex financial problem . Gi,·en his chosen 
JeyeJ of emissions, he has a large set of choices as to how he complies to the RECLAil\1 
rul rs. H0 can purchase a batcmrnt rquiprncnt, buy and sell permits, or some combination of 
thrsc. For rxample. he could delay a batrment a nd buy short- term permits until installation 
of abatement equipment and sell fu turcs after the abatement installat ion date, or any other 
7Deyond 17 permits in rhc future, the data set is quite thin . For later sess ions we d o not have data for 
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Figm<' 4.8: Rcl<1tive vintage of <1 sscts in bids and fulfilled orders 
combination that leaves him compliant . The optimal decision depends on the prices of t he 
permits, as he could choose m any intcrtcmporal combinations. Further, to avoid market 
risk , he would like to m ake t hese decisions as a package so that he docs not expose himself 
to the risk overpaying for the entire p la n as the prices cha nge. For example, if the abi lity 
to cover t he pollution from a new pla nt for the next 20 years is wor th X dolla rs, he can bid 
up to X for the package of permits and know that he will not be charged more than this 
if he receives the desired s tream. Whereas, in a traditional set of parallel markets, one for 
each asset, he would have to bid in each of 20 separate markets a lld hope to pay an average 
price no greater than X / 20 for each . Since in parallel markets it is impossible to submit an 
order t hat depends on events in oth<'r markets, long- term plannin g is a far riskier ventme. 
A planner might be hesitant , for example, to build that new plant under a para llel market 
71 
structure. 
Giwm thA-t A-gents hA.vc this powf' r to express their preferences well via the ACE mecha-
nism, it is surprising to see the modest usc its power receives. But, upon studying bidding 
behavior we see two distinct patterns of bidding emerge. Figure 4.2 shows that, on average, 
18% of submitted bids and 14% of transactions arc for packages. However, as Figure 4.9 
shows, for bids in the spoL market (the earliesl vinlage currently available), approximately 
91% arc for a single asset. Additionally, there arc no swappers at a ll in the spot market. 
That is, of those 9% of bids that arc for more than one asset, the bids are either pure buys 
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Figure 4.9: Percent of bids that are packages, by relative vintage 
H is important to note the discrepaucy in bidding slyles be tween the shorL- and long-
term markets. If we onl_v look at the long-term market , 32% of bids are combined value (for 
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permits more than 3 years in t he future). So, we have a lot of simple trades in the spot and 
short-t0.rrn markets not nsing cornbinf'd-valtte bidding to do so. In the longer-term market 
the bidding is far more frequent ly for packages. In fact, the frequency of package bidding in 
the ACE market is q ui te similar to that observed in the experiments discussed in Chapter 3. 
T he pattern of bidding behavior in the short and long-term ACE markets confirms 
Ha usker 's pred ictions of a ppropriate market behavior , aud refutes some of his concerns about 
risk aversion and ma rket thinness in t he long term market (see Section 4.3). Indeed, we see 
two markets emerge, with very different bidding behavior. By Hansker 's argument, it is 
reasonable to expect bids in the short term market to be s imple, whereas the long-term bids 
are complex as t hey represent production and facility planning. As we shall now demon-
strate, t he pricing patterns in these two markets a re also quite different from one a nother. 
Furthermore, t he long-term market exhibits the stable pricing Hausker feared impos ible. 
4.8 Pricing Patterns in Spot and Future Markets 
As F igure 4.10 shows, asset pricing is dramatically different in the short and long-term 
lllarket~. From the spot market to a bout 7 penuit~ (3~ years) into t he future, t he price 
of penui ts illcreases. Once we look to 4 years iu the future, a nd for the ent ire foreseeable 
fu ture thereon, the pricing is remarkably stable. This is because the type of bids that are 
submitted in the long-term market are for packages, a nd often a host of prices will satisfy the 
ACE mechanism. If there a rc multiple prices that will satisfy the mechanism 's constraints, it 
picks the vector of prices that distributes surplus evenly. That is, ACE finds the competitive 
equilibrium price that maximizes net surplus to the buyers, find the price that does so for 
the sellers, aml take the midpoint as~et-by-a~~et. T he combined-value mechanism provides 
liquidity necessary for stable, meaningful prices in the long-term market. 
Among other pat terns, the data reveal a consistent phenomenon the nearer the permit is 
to expiration (defined as the end of the 60-day reconciliation period) , the lower the purchase 
price. Wh:v might this be? 
Although permi ts are in abundant supply, a firm 's pollut ion is not always entirely pre-







Relative Vin tage 
Figure 4.10: Price of ~Ox Zorw 1 RTCs. as a function of rC'IativC' vintagP 
Lion levds arc susceptible to variables such as weather and prevailing air currents. Therefore , 
a permit buyer may want to purchase extra permits early in the process, but late enough 
that. he can estimate needs well. Furthermore, a short-term buyer is more likely to be cov-
ering an anomaly (production spike, weather patterns, etc.), s ince he has a lready completed 
his horizon planning, and has accounted for all routine needs. This is borne out by the 
infrequency of short-term CV bid . . as explained in the previous section. 
If, during the reconciliation period , all RTC needs for the cycle expiring are known, those 
facilitie~ that are selling have no ueed for their excess RTCs. Furthermore, as Figure 4.11 
shows, there is generally a higher volume of RTCs for sale in the spot market than there 
ar<' bids. Th0.rcfore, WC' would CXJ)('C' t the price of RTCs in thf' r0.conciliation period to b0. 
clriv<'n to zero. \iVhilc prices arc st il l quite low, they arc still definitely d ifferent from this 
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Figure 4. 11: Surplus of volume offered, as a function of relative vintage 
Why do we observe non-zero prices m t he spot m arket? While the number of RTCs 
availa ble acmss both cycles has historically been in excess of reported emissions, this does 
not mean that in a11y given market t llere is an exces::> ::>upply. Finn::> were either a::>sigued to 
Cycle 1 or Cycle 2, and t hen a llocated RTCs. Therefore, it is qui te possible t hat there may 
not he enough permi ts of ~t given cycle to cover that entire year's emissions without hPnefit 
of penni ts from another cycle. 
We, and all faci li ties in the RECLAIM universe, know that there will eventually come a 
time when t here arc less RTCs a llocated than the historica l emissions level. At t his point, 
Lhere will be a shortage of RTCs, aml Lhe J.Jrice will be driven UJ.J . Call the first cycle iu 
which this occurs t imet. RTCs for the previous cycle, call them t - 1, a re abundant relative 
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to time t permits, and can be used to cover pollution in that period. Therefore. owners of 
I TITCs wi ll pmchast:> t - l TITCs in t lmt spot markf't. supportin g a posit.iYe price fort - 1 
permits cvcu though they a re in abundant supply. 
:.Jow. induct backwards. T he faci lity holding t - 1 permits recognizes the value of his 
permits to the t facilities. He will buy spot permits in the market prior to his, load ing up 
on I, - 2 RTCs. Now, he can in part cover his L - 1 emissions wi th L - 2 permits, and is free 
to sell his t - 1 permits to the t playNs. This supports a positive price for t- 2 permits in 
t hf' spot markr t . 
This begs the question, why doesn't the owner of the t- 1 permi ts submi t a package bid 
in the t- 2 spot marke t . swapping the purchase oft- 2 permits for the sale of t- 1 permits? 
There arc two reasons, both d uc to the increasing prices we reported earlier. The first is 
that, as prices are increasing (for a ll vintages), he may prefer to hold some extra RTCs rather 
than being exposed to the prices in the t - 1 spot market should he find himself needing more 
permits to cover unanticipated emissions. The second is that., if the t - 1 faci lity believes 
th a t the price oft - 1 permits in the spot ma rket will be greater than the price they would 
fetch in the t- 2 spot market (when t he t -1 permits are a future permit), then it may pay 
to wait and sell in the latest market possible. 
Since .July 1997, the spot market price has been strictly increasing over time. This is 
because facilities look down t he road and recognize the impending shortage of RTCs, and 
begin rolling permits forward in the manner described above. Since this time, half of t he 
SC'ssions have exh ibited thf' second above property (that the price of a permi t in its spot 
market is greater than that same permit fetched in the previous market , when it was for t he 
future). Furthermore, 4 of the last G ma rkets have exhibi ted this property. Since abatement 
technology has been more rapidly deployed than expected (as discussed in Section 4.5), 
th(' shortage has beeu pushed further iu to tllC' future thau facilities may have anticipated. 
Therefore. it would have been ex ante reasona ble for facilities to believe that the pricing 
property would have held e<1 rliN, more often , and with gre<1tN force. In fact, we have 
now just entered the t ime when the shortage is binding a nd the prices arc skyrocketing, as 
discussed in Section rcfscc:pricing and exemplified in Figure 4.5 . 
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4.9 Conclusion 
T he RECLAii\II market was implemented in the early 19~)Qs with the goal of providing a 
market solution to the problem of ozone-depleting toxins in the Los Angeles Basin. As the 
emissions cap has red uced since then, the prices of RTCs has increased. This refl ects the 
increasing marginal costs of abatement at these lower levels of emissions. While prices are 
increasing, t hey arc still well below the prices predicted by the E missions Trading Model. 
While this is in part due to mis-reporting of abatement costs on behalf of polluting firms 
under the previous command-and-control regime, it a lso reflects the increased abatement 
efforts that t he Rexi bi li ty of t he RECLA 1M progr11,m encourages. The stable pricing a nd low 
t ransaction volumes in the SOx market (with its well-established abatement technology) in 
contrast to t he volat ility and high volume in the NOx market further emphasizes the impact 
of abatement technology penetration on RTC pricing. However, this abatement technology 
cau ouly take the market so far. As of tlle April 2000 market , Lhe spot market permit price 
of $4.23 per pound is aligned with the current beliefs of Best Available Control Technology 
(BACT) prices of $3.50 to $4.50 per pound. The purpose of the RECLAIM program is to 
allow facilities to minimize their cost of compliance by choosing to abate, purchase RTCs, 
reduce or shift production , or some combination of these. Any of these options other than 
the purchase of RTCs requires advance pla nning and can take years to implement. Those 
who have uot l>eguu their plauuing for RTC prices that are now iu line with BACT will pay 
exorbita nt prices for RTCs in the near term, and we can expect the price to increase fur ther, 
past the price of f'missio ns control. However, once capital equipment adjustments have been 
made, prices should equilibrate to the marginal cost of the BACT. 
Karl Hauskcr eloquently voiced many concerns relevant to a permit market such as RE-
CLAIM . In particular , he was concerned that the long-term market would suffer from extreme 
thinness clue to uncertainty, transactions costs, and other sources of market inefficiency as 
enumerated in Section 4.3. Although , as Figure 4.9 shows, the long-term market docs seem 
thinly traded , t he combined-value market mechanism used in the ACE market overcomes 
this illiquidity, as predicted in Chapter 3. The combined-value design allows environmental 
engineers to plan for long-term production and emissions and to do so with more security as 
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to the value of their investment. 
Thf' ACE market meC'hnnisrn has, over the first four yea.rs of t he RECLAIM emissions 
credit t rad ing program, become the mark<'t venue of c-hoice fo r polluting facilities. The 
short-term market and long-term markets exhibit dramatically different bidding and pric-ing 
patterns. The short-term planner places single-asset bids, ma king one-time adjustments 
Lo his predicL<'d emissions l<'v<'ls. For Lhe long-lerm plaHner , Lhe combined value markeL 
prm·id<'s c-lrar , stab!<' pricing and th<' ability to plan a pollution stream \Yi thout the risk 
of only assming part of th<' str<'am. Sinc·C' a s ingle-asset bid is simply a degenerate form 
of combinecl-n1.lue bid , imposing the combined-value structure on the short-term market 
certainly do<'s no harm. Indeed , the add itional liquidi ty provided by t hose few traders who 
trade in bundles including both short- term and long-term RTCs provide a n important bridg<' 
beL ween Lhe two markeLs, impro,·ing liquidity in boLh. 
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Ch apter 5 Conclus ion 
The previous three chapters haw concerned themselves with the possibili ty of solutions to 
pollution abatement programs a nd the nuumer in which they should be implemented. In 
Cha pter 2, we establislwd tll<' existence of a cooperatiYe solu t ion to transbou ndary pollu ti on 
problem in certain pollution configurations. t hose that can be represented as a tree structure. 
This type of pollution flow is observed in the LA basin . as well as other regions where ambient 
air quality is a n issue of growi ng concern. 
For years, economists have favored the idea of tradable pcrmi t markets to implement 
pollution a batement. However, a well-designed pollu t ion permit program has to overcome 
many sout"CPS of market illiquidity if it is to perform well. By performing well , we mC'an a 
market t hat distributes pollution emissions evenly over an area, brings the prices of permits 
in line with the margina l cost of the I3C'st Available Control Technology (I3ACT) at any 
given t ime, provides clear pricing s ignals and encourages sufficient liquid ity to encourage 
long-tenu pla uuiug and trading. Il was with these principles in mind t hat the ACE market 
mechanism, a combined-Yalne trading program. was designed. 
\Ve t f'sterl the ability of a rombinPd-valltP mechanism to overcomf' market thinness in 
Chapter 3. As compared to other experimenta l evaluations of ma rket designs, the combined-
value mechanism performs remarka bly well. Liquidity is reached in markets with only 6 to 14 
people in environments where a parallel ma rket structure requires 50 or more participants. 
O ur results suggest that, to avoid ill iquidity in thin (sma ll-scale) fimw cialmarkets, a portfolio 
trading mechanism should be used. 
After exploring the ability of a combined-value market mecha.nism to overcome illiquidity, 
we t umed to the implementat ion of such a mechanism in the Sou thern Cali fo rn ia RECLATJ\I 
market. Does the combined-value mechanism perform as well in the field as it did in the lab? 
In reality. t he RECLAIJ\I market has performed very well , a lleviating many predicted prob-
lems of market thinness and risk aversion in long-term planning markeL. As time progresses 
and the number of permits availa bl<' reduces below historical emissions, the prices for permits 
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are stabilizing. The spot market prices is now almost exactly equal to the Best Available 
Control TN:hnology p rices. While w0 might expect thcs0 pri c0s to exce0cl the BACT in t.hc 
short-term (during installation and other ad_justments) , it seems clear tha t in the future the 
prices will stabilize at a [eye) equal to the marginal cost of control of emissions, as desired. 
Of course, as t he number of avai lable RTCs reduces, this marginal control cost will increase 
as will the price of RTCs. 
:-Iorcover , the combined-value mark0t mechanism has cr0ated tlw software foundation 
for creating systems of multipl0-it0m bart0r. The items in this cas0 a rc tradable pollution 
permits, but we need not limit ourselves to this applicat ion. Emerging market debt, cargo 
space and freight , virtually any marketplaces where the assets in question have synergistic 
values can benefit from a combined-valu0 market mechanism. vVe now have the ability to 
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Appendix A Experiment Instructions 
A.l Overview 
This session consists of simultaneous market trading periods. There will be three commodi-
ties traded. Two of these co!lunodities are securities. The third COlll!lJOdity is NOTES. Notes 
allow you to borrow and loan money. The securities, SECURITY A and SECURITY B, and 
the OTES have a one period life. That is, they pay a single dividend and are removed 
from the ystem at the end of the period. The currency used in all markets is called francs. 
Each franc is worth AMOUNT HERE. 
A.2 Timing of Events 
At opening of each period you will be given, as "working capital," a portfolio of units of 
SECURITY A, units of SECURITY D and some francs (cash). You are free to place offers to 
purchase and sell as many securities as you want within the limits imposed by your ·working 
capital. You arc uot allowed to purchase sccmitics if you do uot have the francs to pay 
for them. Furthermore, you are not allowed to sell securities unless you actually have them 
in inventory. Th<1t. is, yo11 cannot go short in securities Rncl you cannot pnrchase securities 
beyond the limits of your francs. 
During the first round of a period, you will have 3 minutes to submit bids. Then, the 
bidding will be stopped and all orders will be called. That is, the offers to buy and sell will be 
collected. Orders that can be matched will be completed and payments will be determined. 
After these orders arc completed, another call round begins. All remaining rounds in t he 
period will he 90-scconds long. To sec which of yonr orders were completed in the last call 
round, press either the "Results·' button , or the "Previous Round Results" button. There 
will be 10 rounds in each period. 
At the end of 10 rounds (15 minutes). the dividend payments will be determined and 
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distributed according to the portfo lio you hold a t the close of the period. Your income for 
1 h 0 [)('rio rl cons is ts o f t he diYid C' nds on the sec11ri t ies you hold aJ the c losP, as wPll as t he 
cash you hold a t that po int, minus a predetermined payment (a "loan·' repayment) for the 
working capita l you were given at the beginning of the period . T his incom e will be recorded 
as your earnings for the p eriod. Your working capital will be a utoma tically refreshed and a 
new period will open. There is no carry-over of Securities o r fra ncs from p eriod to period . 
QUESTIO IS ON SECTIONS 1 AND 2: 
1. How long is the fi rs t round in each period? 
(a) 90 seconds 
(b) 3 minutes 
(c) 10 minutes 
2. How long are subsequent rounds? 
(a) 60 seconds 
(b) 90 seconds 
(c) 15 minu tes 
3. How ma ny rounds a rc t here in a period? 
(a) 10 rouuds 
(b) 15 rounds 




The actual dividends paid by Security A will depend on a randomly drawn STATE. There 
are t hree possible states, referred to RS X, Y, l'tnd Z. States are equa lly likely, and the state 
drawn in a given round has no effect on its likelihood of it being drawn in another. The 






X Y Z 
170 370 150 
160 190 250 
100 100 100 
For C!xl'trnple, if the st l'tte is X for some JWriod, then th0. holder of Security A will receive 
170 francs for each unit held at the end of that period and the holder of Securi ty B will 
receive 160 francs for each uni t held at the end of that period. If the state drawn for the 
period is Y then the numbers are 370 and 190 respectively, and if the state is Z t hey are 150 
and 250. 
Notes are like bonds or IOUs that allow :vou to borrow a nd loan francs. Selling a Note is 
like borrowing the amount of the sale price. Buying a Note is like loaning the amount of the 
sale price. For each Note you sell you must pay the holder 100 francs at the end of the period. 
This payment will a utomatically be deducted from your francs a nd dividend payments at 
the end of the period. For example, if you sell a Note for 75 francs you have borrowed 75 
francs and for Lhis loan you repay a loLa! of 100 al l he end of the period. EffecLi vely "you 
repay the loan" of 75 francs plus a 25-franc "interest" payment. If you buy a note for 80 
francs then you have loaned t he seller 80 francs unt il t he end of the period and for this loan 
you will be repaid a total of 100 francs; in essence the 80 francs plus a 20 franc "interest" 
pa:vment. Clearly no one should buy a Note for more than 100 francs because it means that 
the buyer loaned more than would be repaid. At the beginning of the period you will be 
given no Totes. If you sell Notes your inventory will be listed as negative, indicating that 
you must pay 100 francs ou each of t hese, aud if you buy otes your inventory will become 
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positiYe indicating that you wi ll be paid 100 francs for each Tote you hold. You arc not 
a llowC'd to sC' ll over Pight (8) 1otC's (nC't) in any given pPriod. 
QUESTIO S 0 SECTIO 3: 
1. In state X, which commodity is most valuable? 
(a) Security A 
(b) Security B 
(c) ~aLes 
2. lf .vou purchase a Notr for GO fra ncs, how much is t he cff"cct ivc in terest payment? 
(a) 200 francs 
(b) 40 francs 
(e) 60 francs 
3. What is the maxima l number o r ~oLcs you can sell (net) in any given period? 
(a) 8 Notes 
(b) 0 I\otcs 
(c) unlimited 
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A.4 Initial Portfolio and Working Capital 
At the beginning of each period you will be given working capital, which consists of shares of 
Security A, shares of Securi ty B, a nd fran cs. You will not b0. g iv0. n a ny otes. T he wor ki ng 
capital _vou receive can be different from the working capital received by others. For t his 
working capital you must repay a prccletcrmined number of francs (a "working capital loan" 
repayment) at t he end of the period . 
A quick calculation will allow you to calculate the expected payoff of t he working capital. 
On average each Security A will pay 230 fra ncs per period [(1/3)(170+370+150)] reflecting 
t he fact that each of t hP di vid0nds will b0 pa.i rl l /3 of the timr. A simila.r calculation for 
Security B shows that on ayerage each will pay 200 francs per period. The expected end-
of-period payoff of your worki ng capital is t hus 230 times t he number of uni ts of Security A 
plus 200 times the number of units of Security B plus t he number of francs. Subt ract from it 
the required "working capilalloau" repaymcnl aml you gel your expected income from the 
working capital. For instance, if you arc given 4 Securities A, 5 Securities B and 400 francs 
cash, a.nd a.rf' rf'quired to r0pa,y 1000 fra.ncs for it a.t. the f'nd, your C'Xp<Octed incom0 \Vould 
be 1320 francs (=4*230+5*200+!00-1000) . Note that losses a rc permi tted. HoweYer , if you 
suffer a loss for two consecut ive periods, you are in default and can no longer participate. 
QUESTIONS ON SECTION 4: 
1. Which has the highest expected value? 
(a) they' re the same 
(b) Security B 
(c) Notes 
(d ) Security A 
2. If you have 3 securities A, 2 securi t ies B , 500 francs cash , a nd a 1000 franc loan 
repayment, your expected income is: 
(a) 590 francs 
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(b) 1500 francs 
(c) 1000 francs 
State 
Security X y z 
A 170 370 150 
B 160 190 250 
c 100 100 100 
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A.5 How the Market Trading System Works 
T he market is diYidcd into DO-second rounds (with the exccption of round 1, which is 3 
minttt es) during which yon clln submit orders to t he market. An ordf'r is a list ing of the 
uni ts of Securi ty A, Security B a nd notes. along with a fra nc amount. A buy order implies 
that you want to buy the specified number of units at the specified price or less, and a sell 
order implies that you want to sell t he specified number of uni ts at the specified price or more. 
From the main window, you can choose the BIDBOOK button to view your bidbook. An 
cxamplc of a bid book window is below. T his window shows your budget, your current assets, 
thf' n1luf' of your current port folio by state (net of your work ing capita l loan repayment) , 
a nd thc status of any created bids. In order to create a new b id , press the CREATE button. 
\Vhen you press t he CREATE button , the create bid window appears. There is a column 
for each commodity under thc heading ASSETS in the left hlllf of t he window. Enter the 
nutHbcr of uni t::> that you would like to buy or ::>ell in the box la beled "Request." Note that 
ordcrs for fractions arc allowed, and orders will not be rounded. Below the uni t request, 
indicaJC' wlwthf'r this is ll htty or sf' ll ordf'r. E nter thC' price per unit at which yon are willing 
to buy or sell each commodity in the box labeled "Price/unit." DO NOT enter a price under 
the box labeled ·'Portfolio Price," as the portfolio price will be a utomatically generated from 
the individual buy and sell prices. Finally, enter a scale in the box labeled "Scale" (explained 
below). 
Below is an example of an order to sell 10 units of A and buy 2.5 units of B and 4 units 
of )J otf's with a scale of 0. 
There arc severa l features of the a bove that a rc important: 
1. T he order is for a package of items. The cale of 1.0 (explained below) means Lhat 
it is an a ll or nothiug order, iu that the eutire amount (lOA, 2.5B, aud 4 :'\OTES) 
requested must be filled if the order is to be a valid transaction. 
2. If the order is a buy ord<'r , Portfolio Price = (number of uni ts) * (price per uni t). If 
the order is a sell order, Portfolio Price = -(number of uni ts) * (price per uni t). The 
Portfolio Price of a buy order will a lways be p o::>iti vc, and the Por tfolio P rice for a sell 
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order will a lways be negative. 
3. Regardless of whether you enter a price under "Portfolio Pric0." the computer will usc 
the "Price/unit" price to cakulate the portfolio price. If you enter only a portfolio 
price, Lhen t he computer will tak0 the Price/uni t, and Lh0rcfore the portfolio price as 
$0. 
4. A buy offer is an upper bound on wha t you are willing to pay. A sell offer is a lower 
bound on the amount of francs you are willing to receive for Lhe order. 
FOR A DETAILED EXA~dPLE EXPLAIJ\'ING THESE PROPERTIES, CLICK HERE. 
(This informa.t ion is ava.ila.b!P in S0ction i\.6.) 
A.5.1 Tailoring your Order 
Your order can be customized in two ways that may assist you in obtaining a desired tra ns-
action. 
1. Scalable Orders: Recall t hat the order placed in the above example was a ll or nothing. 
You can request your orc! C'r to h0 lC'ss restrictive. You do this by submitting a scale 
number between 0 and l by which you would be willing to sc·al f' your order to hav0 it 
accepted. The best way to expla in this feature is with a n example. Suppose a scale of 
0.5 is submitted with the order. T his means t hat you arc willing to sell 5A, buy 1.25B 
a nd 2 Notes for a package price of no more than 3 francs. That is, one-half scales all 
uni ts. The choice of a 0.5 scale also meam; that you are willing to scale your order to 
any factor between 0.5 and 1.0. A choice of a 1 scale means that you a re willing to 
trade only the entire amount of your order. A choice of a 0 scale means that you arC' 
willing to trade any fraction of .vour order. 
2. Open Orders: To subllli l yom bid, click on Lhe "Open bid ,'. "Partially open bid," or 
"Closed bid" button. If you submit a c:losect order, no other part icipa nt c:an view what 
you s0nd to the market.. If you wo uld like oth0rs t.o sec what. you sent. to the market, 
you can send t he orckr to th0 opPn book. You can send your orcl0r as either partially 
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or fully opC'n. A p ar t ially open order sends the quantities requested only. A fully op<'n 
ordrr SC' nds both th<: quantities and th<' prices r<'qu <:s tC'd. All participants ran v i<:w 
orders in the open book and will be part of the ord ers submitted to th<' market. If you 
would like to Yiew the opC'n or pa r t ia lly open bids that others have submitted, click on 
the "Public:" button in .\·our main window. 
A.5.2 Order Restrictions 
Your order c:an be submitted lo Lhe ma rkC't if it does not violate your credit line and you do 
not try to sC'll more units than you have in your account. The constraint on your orders is 
cumulativ<'. That is . C'ach tim<' an ordC'r is submitted your account is reducC'd by the amount 
in that order. Sell orders count against the item account a nd buy offers are subtracted from 
your franc account. However , sell orders do not increase your franc account and buy orders 
do not increase your uni t accounts. 
Below is an example of a player 's bidbook after two bids have been submitted. T he first 
order is a buy order for 5 uni ts of A at 50 frcuH.:sjuuit , with a port folio price of 250 francs. 
The order is all or nothing (scale=l ), a nd the order is a partially open order , as denoted 
by the ha lf sun. The second order is a sell o rder for 2 uni ts of A at 75 francs/unit , wit h 
a portfolio price of -168.75 francs. This player is willing to sell any fraction of thC' order 
(sc:ale=O), a nd the order is a closed order (no sun). Note that posit ive units imply a buy 
order a nd negative units imply a sell order. To change an orde r, click the EDIT button next 
to that order. To delete or duplicate an order , check t he box labeled "Select," aud theu click 
either the DELETE or D UPLICATE button, depending on your choice of action. 
C~tll RC'sults: 
The amount you will pay (receiYe if the market price is negative) fo r an accepted order 
is : 
Your payment= (market buy prices* am ounts you buy) - (marke t sell prices* amounts 
you sell) + a possible inflexibili Ly penalty 
Your payment will havC' t he following simple properties: 
1. Your payment will a lways be less lha n or equa l to your offer am ount. 
93 
2. In general, you are chargcd a penalty only because your tmwillingness to scale to zero 
mf'HJlS wC' haxP to chargf' ot hPrs IC'ss than thP markf' t pricC' in ord0r to accept you r offf'r. 
3. If your buy (sell) order is acceptC'd and your payment is equal to your offer, but 
lC'ss (more) Lhan iL would be aL market , you have b<'en included because you helped 
complete an inflexible trade. 
4. If your order is accepted and you pay (r<'ccive) !C'ss (more) than your offer and you pay 
no penalty, t hen raising your offer price would not have changed whether the order was 
accC'pted or your payment for the order. 
5. In gf'nPral. your orckr wil l stand a hettPr c.hancP of being accf'p tcd the higher your 
offer is and the more ftexiblc it is. T he most flexible order is a simple order in on ly 
one asset and a scale of 0.0. 
Even if no t rad e takes place in a round, a market price may be calculated. This price 
rdif'cts a bid price that may havC' rf'SttltC'd in trade. o t<' , howf'vf' r, t lutt C'vcn if you submit 
a buy (s<'ll ) order with a pricc high<'r (lowcr) than the markC't price listed. there a re many 
scena rios in which trade still ma_,. not occur. For example. you may haw submitted a fully 
flexible buy order for one unit of security A at a price of 175. The market price was 170, 
bu t you r Lrade did not execute. This may be because the only sell order was an inflexible 
bid for 2 unit~ of a~~et A. Or, tiH' sell order may have beeu a package bid for units of A and 
B, and there was no order with which t he B side could be matched . So, t he market price 
should be used on ly as a n indicator of the market, not a market clearing price. 
After the round is completed , your Bidbook will upda te a utomatically, indicating which 
of your bids \YCre accepted and which are ·'out." T he solver will not consider any bids labeled 
"out" in tlw following round. However, if you would like to resubmit a ll of your bids, you 
can do :-;o by clicking the '·Renew Bids" button. In order to edit a bid , cl ick edi t button for 
that bid. If you would like to delete or duplicate a bid. click t he select bu tton for that bid 
ancl thf'n sPlPc.t clclctc or d uplicat<'. 
QUESTIONS ON SECTIO 5: 
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1. A package bid to buy 2 units of Security A at 100 francs and sell 3 Notes at 150 francs 
"·ill list n pnckagC' price of: 
(a) 250 francs 
(b) -250 francs 
(c) 650 francs 
2. If you submit an o rder to buy 4 SecuriLiC's A and 3 Secnrities B with a scale of .25, 
which or the~e purcha~e~ nrc you willing to accept? 
(a) 1A, .75B 
(b) 3A, 2 B 
(c) 4A, 1 B 
3. If you choose "Partially Open Bid" whcu creating a bid, what information is sent to 
the open book? 
(a) quantities 
(b) quantities and prices 
(c) quantities, prices and bidder ID 
State 
S0curity X Y Z 
A 170 370 150 
B 160 190 250 
c 100 100 100 
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A.6 Illustration of the Five Pricing Properties 
Suppose the following orders have been submitted: 
Bid ~umber Q ua nt ity Gnit Ofl'er 
1 2 G 
2 3 4 
3 2 2 
4 2 
5 -1 .5 
6 -2 1.5 
7 -3 3 
8 -3 3.5 
If all were scaled at 0, they would yield t he following dema nd-supply picture of the book: 
T he first step of t he market t rading system is to accept t he collection of orders l hat 
maximize t he gains from trade. Ilere, orders 1,2,5, and 6 are fully accepted and 2 units of 
order 7 arc accep ted . Tlw gains from Lrad <' a rc 12.50 francs. 
T he next step of the market t rading system is to set prices. Here, the price will be 3.50. 
This sat isfies PROPERTY 1: your payment is less than or equal to your accepted offer. 
Here any pric-e between 3 and 4 would work. so 3.50 is choseu in t he middle. 
Accepted Orders Q uantity Ac-cepted Pay (receive) R evealed Gain 
1 2 2(3.5)=7 3 
2 3 3(3.5)= 10.5 1.5 
5 -1 -1 (3.5)=-3.5 3 
6 -2 -2(3.5)=-7 4 
7 -2 -2(3 .5)=-7 1 
TOTAL 0 0 12.5 
PROPERTY 4 is il lustrated by bid 1 (as well as 5 and 6) . If l had bid for 2 units at 
10f/ uni t, t he order would still have been accepted and wou ld still have pa id 7f. If order two 
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had set a bu:v price of 4.5, it would sti ll have been accepted but would have paid 2(3.75) = 7.5, 
lwcattsc it would hav<: afi"~:ctrd the prier. 
Now let us consider the same example, but assume that order 5 is a ll-or-none. That is, 
its scale is set at 1. Then t he story is the same as before. The accepted orders and price arc 
identica l. 
Now, Su!Jpose order 7 is scaled at 1. If it is not accepted , theu 2 uni ts of order 2 wi ll not 
trade and gains from t radr would be 10.5, bu t if order 3 is us<'d to help complete ord('r 7, 
gains wonld lw 11.5. So, maximizing tlw gains from trade means accepting orders 1,2,5,6,7 
and 1 uni t of 3. 
So far so good. But now there is no s ingle price satis fyin g property 1. Such a price would 
have to be greater than 3 (for order 7) and less t han 2 (for order 3) . T he m arket trading 
system deals wi lh this in 3 sleps. In step 1, it acls as if all orders a re scaled al 0 and then 
computes t rades and prices as previously described. In this <.:ase, as before, 1,2,5,6 and part 
of 7 trade at a price of 3.5. 
In step 2, a ll orders that would have faced a loss at this price arc iden t ified. Here only 
order 3 has this problem. since (2)- (3.5). 
If we were to stop now the market would have to pay o u t more t han it receives. In step 
3, this shortfall is colleclecl from t he inflexib le orders that cause it. In th is case, 01·clcr 7 
must pay an inflexibility penal ty of 1.5. T his is the amount order 3 is short. This illustrates 
PROPERTY 2. The final result of the market call is: 
Accep ted Orders Quantity Accepted Pay (receive) Revealed Gain 
1 2 2(3.5)=7 3 
2 3 3(3.5)=10.5 1.5 
5 -1 -1 (3.5)=-3.5 3 
6 -2 -2(3.5)=-7 4 
7 -3 -3(3.5)-1.5=-9 0 
3 1 1(2)=2 0 
TOTAL 0 0 11.5 
Notice t hat o rders 1,2,5 and 6 arc unaffected by the inflexibility. O rder 7 compensat es 
order 3 the 1.5 necessary to complete a trade. Order 7 received 1 in revealed surplus when 
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scaled at 0 a nd receives 0 when scaled at 1. But 7 may really be better of if, for example, he 
grts a tn1r lwnrfit of 12 with 3 uni ts and 6 with 2 units. Then und er a 0 sr.alc 7 gets 6-7= -1 
and under a 1 scale 7 gets 12-9=3. 
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A.7 The Mechanics of the Interface 
The interface has many powerful properties for you to us<' in making decisions and placing 
your bids: 
1. Once you have entered your bids, you may edit them in the bidbook window. Select a 
bid (or Irt<:UIY) by checkiug the "Selec t" buttou on the t'IH.l of t hat bid's row. You may 
then edi t, delete. undelete , or duplicate the bid. 
2. After t he round ends a nd bids arc submitted, your bid book will tell you which bids 
were accepted (labclccl ''In" ) and which were not (labeled "Out"). You can re-submit 
all of your "out" bids by pressing LliC "Renew Bids" buLton in the bidbook. 
3. The time remaining in the current round and the time remain ing until the next round 
begins ar<' displayed on your ma in window, your bidbook, and you create bid page. 
As discussed earlier , all rounds wi ll be 90 seconds long, with the exception of the first 
round of each period. T here will be a pause (30-50 seconds) between rounds for you 
to revit'w the results of the preYious round. If t he timer ceases to fuuction (rufresh iug 
every few seconds), PLEASE ALERT THE MONITOR. 
4. You can check how much you have earned in the experiment thus far in the experiment 
by selecting the ''Earnings" button on the main window. 
5. You can check the results from previous rounds in t.he current period by selecting the 
"Previous Rounds" button on the main window. 
G. If you would like to view the open or partially open bids that other. have submitted , 
click ou the ·'Public" button in your 111ain window. 
7. Along with the Internet interface, you will also have a portfolio calculator availa ble 
to you, in an Excel spreadsheet. Csing this spreadsheet, you can enter prices a nd a 
potential portfolio. T he sheet will tell you the value of the portfolio as well as the 
return on your investment. 
A.8 
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How You Make Money 
T he following examples will help you understand the Yarious possibilities. 
Example 4 Do nothing. 
Suppose you start and end with 4 units of Security A plus 400 francs. Your expected divi-
dends from the securi t ies arc 920 francs (230 each times 4 securities) from the A Securities. 
Adding the 400 francs yields a lot<tl of 1320 francs you expect to hold at the end of the period. 
From this sulJLracL the required working capital loan repayment for Lhc capita l advance. say, 
llOO. Your earnings would be 220 francs (on aYcrage). 
Example 5 Play it safe. 
T his means that yon sP-11 all of your scc:urit.ies ancl loan out t he money (buy Notes) yo 11 
receive in payment. Of course, in t his case your earnings depend upon the prices at which 
you transact. Assume that you arc given a working capital of 4 Securities A, 5 Securities 
B and 400 francs cash. Assume your working capital loan is 2100 francs. Suppose you are 
able Lo sell a ll securities al Lhcir expected value, Lhal is, aL 230 for Securities A, aud aL 200 
for Securi t ies B. This would produce 1920 francs revenue. Adding the 400 francs cash with 
which you s tarted gives yoiL a total of 2320 francs. This guarantees yo iL an income of 220 
francs (2320 cash , minus the 2100 francs repayment for working capital). Now, these 2320 
francs can be invested in Notes. You could buy 23 1'\otes if you pa id the full repayment value 
of 100 each (of course you would make no profit in this case), but if you purchase at less 
Lhau 100 yo u make Lhe difference on each !\ole you buy. Suppose you could buy 25 NoLes 
at 90 each (a total investment of 2250 francs of your 2320). Each repays 100 so you make 
10 on each for a profit of 250. Your period earnings would be 220 + 250 = 470 francs for 
the period. Of course this calcu lat ion makes important assumptions about the prices you 
received for the securities and the prices that you paid for tlw Notes. 
Example 6 Speculate ou price changes. 
Anything you buy can be resold. If you sell at a price higher t han you paid, you make the 
difference. This difTerencc is in Lite form of iucreased francs which you can Lhen invest in 
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S0curitics and receive the returns. 
Example 7 L0v0raging. 
Sell all of your Securi ty B and usC:' th<' francs to purchase Secmity A. In addi t ion , use your 
ini t ial francs to purchase Security A. Finally, sell a ll the Notes you arc able and use t he francs 
to purchase Security A. Suppose that price's arc at the expected value of 230 for A and 200 
forB, and that the price of Notes is 90. Suppose you have 2 Securi ties A and 7 Securities B 
ini t ially, and that you were given .J.OO francs cash. Assume your working capita l loan is 1700 
fra ncs. Selling all of B gene rates 1400 francs; selling 3 Notes generates 270 francs. Together 
with the illi t ial cash a llocation. you llOW hold 2370 frallcs in cash . \Vi t h it, you call purchase 
10 Sec uri tics A, at a cost of 2300 francs, leaving you with 70 fra ncs cash. At the end of t he 
p0riod , you wil l hC' holding 13 SC'C·uri t. iC's A anrl 70 fran cs in cash. You wi ll be requi red t.o 
pa_v 300 francs for t he (short) sale of the 3 Notes, in addi t ion to the 1700 francs that you 
owe for t he working capital. If t he state is X, Y or Z, your dividends would be 2210, 481 0, 
1950 respectively; t he correspond ing period earnings would be 280, 2880, 20 respectively. 
Example 8 Fully invested hedge. 
You might use your fra ncs cash to purchase Securities B and a lso sell Notes a nd usc t he 
proceeds to purchase even mor<' Secmities B . Since Security B d ividends are low in those 
states ill which Security A dividends a re high, your overall variabili ty of retums is reduced. 
Securi ty A pays a large dividend o f 370 if state Y occurs, but it only pays 150 if st ate Z 
occurs. By pu rchasing some of t he Security B you will be able to "insure" your holdin gs of 
Secur ity A somewhat because Security B pays 250 francs in state Z. 
A.9 Why Submit a Package Bid 
The following example wi ll illustrate the benefit of submitting a bid for a bundle of goods 
rather than bids for single assets. Suppose .vou are attempting to execute a ful ly inYestccl 
hedge, as expla ined above. Suppose' further t hat you wish to buy 2 units of A for 200 francs 
only if you can hedge against Lhe risk by purchasing 3 un its of Bat 200 fra ncs. If you submit 
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two separate orders (one to purchase A and one to purchase B), you a rc not guarante0d 
thnt both will bicls will he ac:ccptecl . For exa,mplc, if thr bid for A t ransact but the hid for 
B does not a nd state Z occurs, then you will suffer a loss of 100 fra ncs (2*200 - 2*150 = 
-100). Ho,Ye,·er , if t his bid had been submitted as a package and t ransacted , the state Z 
value would be a profit of 50 francs (2* 130 + 3*250 - 2*200 - 3*200 = 50) . 
QUESTIONS ON SECTION 7: 
1. \Vha t mcthocl of ma ki ng money is t h0 riski est , hut yi0lds t he highest rr wa rd? 
(a) fully invested hedge 
(b) leveraging 
(c) speculate on pric0 cha nges 
2. Which commodi ty is t he riskies t? 
(a) Securi ty A 
(b) Securi ty B 
(c) NoLes 
State 
Securi ty X Y Z 
A 170 370 150 
B 160 190 250 
c 100 100 100 
